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URBAN DRAINAGE: ASPECTS OF PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE LIABILITY
By

WILLIAM

E.

KENWORTHY*

As April showers bring May flowers, it seems to be equally
true that July thunderstorms bring August litigation concerning
drainage. The-greater portion of this litigation arises in cities where
open ground, which once edgerly absorbed rain, has been replaced
by roads, sidewalks and rooftops. Drains have been constructed and
maintained -with varying degrees of foresight and care. Improvements have been made which change the natural grade of the land.
The phenomenon of the large-scale residential subdivision has added
problems of new dimension and scope. Not only is the storm run-off
increased in volume from the waterproofed urban landscape, but
also the critical storm flow is concentrated into a shorter time.
Nevertheless, the problems incident to municipal drainage are
by no means new. The will of Benjamin Franklin reflected his
concern for the water supply and drainage situation in Philadelphia.
Since that time a formidable, sometimes confusing, body of law has
been developed on the various aspects of this subject. It is the aim
of this article to present some of the basic doctrines and trends
relating to both public and private liability for the interference with.
drainage within the confines of a municipality.
At the outset, it is advisable to review the basic rules relating
to the drainage of surface waters which have been applied in the
United States. Traditional analysis divides the nation into two
camps: the common law or "common enemy" states and the civil
law states. In reality there now seem to be four distinct apo)roaches
to the subject, with numerous variants upon each. Under the common law doctrine, surface waters are regarded as a "common enemy." Every property owner has the right to take steps to expel
such waters from his own land by any appropriate means without
liability for casting the water upon another's land. Under the civil
law rule of "natural servitudes," lower lands are servient to the
natural surface drainage from all lands above. However, the servitude exists only for natural drainage; an upper proprietor may not
do anything to alter the natural drainage conditions in any way
under the strict civil law rule.'
A third group of states have now adopted a modified version
of either rule. Generally, it seems to make little difference whether
the modification takes as its base the common enemy or the civil
law rule. In either event a landowner is normally entitled to make
reasonable changes in his land to alter or accelerate the natural
drainage, so long as water is not collected and cast in a body upon
the land of a neighbor. A fourth rule, based upon "reasonable user,"
* An associate of the Denver firm of Fugote, Mitchem, McGinley & Hoffman.
I 6-A American Law of Property § 28.63 (Casner ed. 1954).
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rejecting both
reaches essentially the same result, while specifically
2
the common enemy and the civil law rules.
The Restatement of Torts, section 833, takes the broad position
that liability for interference with the flow of surface waters rests
upon the same basis as liability for an invasion of property by vibrations, noise, smoke or pollution: "Where the invasion is not
intentional, the liability . . . depends upon whether his conduct
has been negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous ....
Where, however,

the invasion is intentional, liability depends upon whether the invasion is unreasonable." In viewing this broad basis, it should be
borne in mind that invasion by water is not strictly analogous to
invasion by the other forces mentioned above, all of which are
created by the activity of man. However, the application of the
rules stated would lead, in. most instances, to the same result as
the "modified doctrine" now applied in many states.
It may be noted in passing that there are circumstances from
which an easement or irrevocable license for drainage may be
created. Hence, the possible application
of basic real property doc3
trines should not be overlooked.
Two variables are common to almost every drainage case. The
first is the original position of the parties on the surface of the land.
Did waters originally drain from A toward B or vice versa? The
second variable relates to the action of which complaint is made.
The action may be preventive, by repelling water which would
otherwise drain onto the land, or positive, which would consist of
steps taken to increase the speed or quantity of drainage from the
land. Neither of these variables per se changes the result under the
common enemy doctrine. Either the upper or the lower proprietor
may improve his lot, and it makes
no difference whether the water
4
is cast off or simply repelled.
I.

PRIVATE LIABILITY

A. The Common Enemy Doctrine
The first known application of the common enemy doctrine in
the United States is Gannon v. Hargadon5 in 1865. In 1881 the com2 An excellent review of general law pertinent to the subject of surface drainage can be found
in an annotation at 59 A.L.R.2d 421 (1958). The following list compiled from the annotation and
other sources may be found useful for quick reference. There is some overlapping in the lists due
to the application of different rules to urban and rural property.
Common Enemy States
Civil Low States
Civil Law States
Modified Doctrine
(Continued)
(Continued)
Alabama
Arkansas
Connecticut
Arizona
Tennessee
No. Dakota
Dist. of Columbia
California
Texas
Ohio
Oklahoma
Hawaii
Georgia
Vermont
Indiana
Idaho
Oreqon
Virgina
Illinois
Modified Doctrine
Iowa
Maine
Iowa
Pennsylvania
Massachusetts
Kansas
Alabama
So. Dakota
Missouri
Kentucky
Arkansas
Montana
Louisiana
Florida
Reasonable User
New York
Michigan
Iowa
North Dakota
New Mexico
Colorado
Minnesota
No. Carolina
Maryland
So. Carolina
New Hampshire
Mississippi
Ohio
Washington
New Jersey
Wisconsin
So. Dakota
Nebraska
It appears significant to note that, unlike the clear-cut distinction between riparian and appropriation doctrine states with respect to the use of water, there is little pattern along geographical or
climatological lines in the states differing as to the drainage of water.
3 See, e.g., Messinger v. Township of Washington, 185 Po.Super. 554, 137 A.2d 890 (1958), an
irrevocable license for a drain.
4 United States v. Shapiro, 202 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Kossoff v. Rathgeb-Walsh, Inc., 3
N.Y.2d 583, 170 N.Y.S.2d 789, 148 N.E.2d 132 (1958).
5 10 Allen (Mass.) 106 (1865).
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mon enemy doctrine was applied to urban drainage problems in
the state of New York.6 The plaintiff brought an action against a
neighbor who had filled his own lot, thereby preventing the historic drainage from a small pond in the street in front of the plaintiff's lot. Adopting the dictum of an earlier case, it was held that
surface waters could be repelled at will without liability. The decision was limited, however, to those improvements made in good
faith.
New Jersey initially followed the common enemy ,doctrine.
Some of the most interesting applications of that doctrine to urban
conditions arose there.7 In one instance litigation arose over rain
water even before it reached the ground. Adjoining property owners
each constructed a garage about one tenth of one foot from the
division line and directly opposite the other's garage. The plaintiff
complained that water from the defendant's higher roof poured
against his garage, causing a wet wall. It was held that no relief
could be granted since the common enemy doctrine applied. 8
The common enemy doctrine was also applied in New Jersey
to favor the development of land for residential subdivisions. A
most exhaustive discussion of this aspect, as well as drainage law
generally throughout the country, can be found in Yonadi v. Homestead Country Homes, Inc.9 Action there was brought by a lower
proprietor against the developer of a higher forty-acre tract, which
previously had been farm land. The defendant had installed drains
and had increased the run-off by the change to residential uses. It
was found that at least thirty of the forty acres still drained to the
same area or point as originally, but there was some doubt as to
whether the grading had changed the drainage pattern for the remaining ten acres. It was pointed out that, in general, one who
improves or alters land is not subject to liability for affecting the
flow of surface waters. However, an exception exists that imposes
absolute liability for transmitting water, by means of artificial devices such as drains or ditches, in a body large enough to do substantial injury and casting it upon lands where it otherwise would
not have flowed. The trial court's judgment for the plaintiff was
6 Barkley v. Wilcox, 86 N.Y. 140, 40 Am.Rep. 519 (1881).
7 In Hopler v. Morris Hills Regional Dist., '45 N.J.Super. 409, 133 A.2d 336 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1957), a "reasonable use" rule was adopted. See text, section E. Reasonable Use Rule.
8 McCullough v. Hartpence, 141 N.J.Eq. 499, 58 A.2d 233 (Ch. 1948).
9 35 N.J.Super. 514, 114 A.2d 564 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1955). See also Granger v. Elm Tree
Village, 23 N.J.Super. 592, 93 A.2d 641 (Super. Ct. Ch. 1952).
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remanded with directions to determine whether this exception
applied to the ten acres. 10
Application of the common enemy doctrine to subdivision developments was summarized in Wallace v. Schneider," a Kentucky
case: "The owner of the dominant estate may drain and ditch his
land for the purpose of ridding it of surface water . . . building
sewers, gutters and culverts without liability . . . so long as he

does not tap additional territory
from which surface waters other12
wise would not have flowed.

B. The Civil Law Doctrine
The strict civil law approach, prohibiting both upper and lower
proprietors from altering natural drainage conditions has seemingly
found little application to purely urban conditions. However, some
modern cases apply the doctrine to city property. 3 In one instance
it was invoked as a 14basis for municipal liability arising from a defective storm sewer.
The process of urbanization necessarily changes the drainage
regimen; natural drainage conditions no longer exist. Hence, the
application of strict civil law doctrines to land within cities tends
to be unrealistic. Furthermore, such a rule has a tendency to inhibit
growth and development. Property owners may be discouraged
from bringing their land to grade. As will be shown subsequently,
these considerations have led some states to adopt a distinction
between rural and urban property in their drainage law. In other
states the civil law rule has been modified in order to free urban
development from its liabilities. 15
C. Modified Common Law Rule
In those states modifying the common law rule, it has been
stated in effect that one may repel surface water subject to the
limitation that he must not act wantonly or unnecessarily. This
means that improvements must be made in good faith with such
care as not to injure needlessly the adjoining property. 16 A further
qualification has been expressed that one cannot collect water in
an artificial channel and cast it upon his neighbor's land.1 7 Another
stated exception is that the landowner must not act negligently in
shutting out the flow of surface water.'8 Normally the action affecting
drainage is incident to some other program of improvement. 19 However, the improvement of drainage conditions alone
should suffice to justify action.
10

An application of the same exception is West Orange v. Field, 37 N.J.Eq. 600, 45 Am.Re,

670 (Ct. Err. & App. 1882). It should also be noted that the common enemy doctrine does not Opp
to collections of ice or snow, Brownsey v. General Printing Ink Corp., 118 N.J.L. 505, 193 AtI.
824 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
11310 Ky. 17, 219 S.W.2d 977 (1949).
12 Id. at 22, 219 S.W.2d at 980.
13 See, e.g., Rinzler v. Folsom, 209 Go. 549, 74 S.E.2d 661 (1953); Hancock v. Stull, 199 Md.
434, 86 A.2d 734 (1952); Olson v. Westerberg, 2 III.App.2d 285, 119 N.E.2d 413 (1954). The latter
case, although applying the civil low approach, speaks of trespass by successive invasions of
water and silt.
14 Cannon v. City of Macon, 81 Go.App. 310, 58 S.E.2d 563 (1950).
15 6-A American Law of Property 1 28.63 (Casner ed. 1954).
16 Mason v. Lamb, 189 Va. 348, 53 S.E.2d 7 (1949).
17 Hodges Manor Corp. v. Mayflower Park Corp., 197 Va. 344, 89 S.E.2d 59 (1955).
18 Taylor v. Harrison Constr. Co., 178 Pa.Super. 544, 115 A.2d 757 (1955).
19 Roth v. Great A & P Tea Co., 108 F.Supp. 390 (E.D. N.Y. 1952); Nassau County v. Cherry
Valley Estates, Inc., 281 App.Div. 692, 117 N.Y.S.2d 616 (1952); Pfeil v. Trischett, 137 N.Y.S.2d 668
(Sup. Ct. 1954).
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D. Modified Civil Law Rule
The civil law rule has been modified in some instances to permit the alteration of natural drainage conditions by an upper proprietor, provided the water is not sent down in a manner or quantity to do more harm than formerly. This has been expressed as
the civil law rule, "modified to meet the exigencies and circumstances of each21particular case. '20 Again, questions of due care become involved.
There is some support for a rule that where two methods of
disposing of water are available, each equally efficacious, and
neither requiring unreasonable expense, the one which will not
damage adjoining property must be chosen. For instance, in Holman
v. Richardson," a lower proprietor had to dig a drainage ditch rather
than build a brick wall, the cost of either being equal.
An interesting application of the civil law approach occurred
in Maryland. The defendant's predecessor had installed a tile drain
in place of a ditch across the premises and had built over the drain.
Because a very unhealthy condition was eventually created by lack
of maintenance, the defendant blocked the drain. The plaintiff, an
upper proprietor, sought an injunction. It was decreed that the
defendant need not reopen
the drain unless the plaintiff put it in
23
repair and maintained it.

E. Reasonable Use Rule
After years of adherence to the common enemy doctrine, New4
Jersey recently abandoned it in favor of the "reasonable use" rule.'
Minnesota and New Hampshire also follow it. Reasonablesness becomes a question of fact, allowing consideration of all pertinent
factors. As stated by the New Hampshire court: "In determining
the question of reasonableness, the effect of the use upon the interests of both parties, the benefits derived from it by one, the injury caused by it to the other, and all the circumstances affecting
either of them, are to be considered."' 5
F. The Urban-Rural Distinction
As a general rule, most states recognize a distinction between
rural and urban conditions in the application of drainage law. 26
However, the results are not uniform among the states making this
distinction. In a limited number of civil law states it mdkes no difference whether the controversy arises in a city or in the country. 27
20 Boulder v. Boulder & White Rock Ditch & Reservoir Co., 73 Colo. 426, 430, 216 Pac. 553, 555
(1923); accord, Johnson v. Johnson, 89 Colo. 274, 1 P.2d 581 (1931).
21 Drainage Dist. v. Auckland, 83 Colo. 510, 267 Pac. 605 (1928).
22 115 Miss. 169, 76 So. 136 (1917); accord, Cowan v. Baker, 227 Miss. 828, 87 So.2d 74 (1956).
23 Whitman v. Forney, 181 Md. 652, 31 A.2d 630 (1943).
24 Hopler v. Morris Hills Regional Dist., 45 N.J. Super. 409, 133 A.2d 336 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1957).
25 Franklin v. Durgee, 71 N.H. 186, 191, 51 AtI. 911, 913 (1901). See also Enderson v. Kelehan,
226 Minn. 163, 32 N.W.2d 286 (1948).
26 There seems to be little definition of the demarcation between rural and urban areas. It has
been held that land in an incorporated village is urban, in spite of the total absence of sewer
improvements. Keiser v. Mann, 102 Ohio App. 324, 143 N.E.2d 146 (1956). The case first recognizing
the distinction in Ohio was Lunsford v. Steward, 95 Ohio App. 383, 129 N.E.2d 136 (1953), which
added the qualification that the improvements made in an urban area must be made in a "reasonable manner."
It Las also been held that a subdivision with four lots per acre, without drains,
gutters, or sewers, .vould be regarded as urban. Leiper v. Heywood-Hall Constr. Co., 381 Pa. 317,
113 A.2d 148 (1955).
27 56 Am. Jur. Waters § 78 (1947); Johnson v. Morcum, 152 Ky. 629, 153 S.W. 959 (1913); Carland v. Aurin, 103 Tenn. 555, 53 S.W. 940 (1899). In the latter case it was expressly stated, "We
are unable to see any difference in principle between the reciprocal rights and duties of adjacent
urban proprietors and adjacent rural proprietors."
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In some instances the distinction has applied in reverse, with
a more strict rule concerning the drainage of surface water being
applied to urban property. Thus, in Ginter v. Rector of St. Mark's
Church28 the court stated:
It does not follow that because in the country an upper proprietor may be permitted to aid the surface water on his
field in its exit through a natural channel upon a lower
proprietor ...

the same thing can be done in a city in thick-

and
ly settled portions, where improvements are general,
29
a common drainage system has been provided.
28 95 Minn. 14, 103 N.W. 738 (1905).
29 Id. at 22, 103 N.W. at 741.

NATURAL GAS
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The reasoning in that case seems to assume that the city is obligated
to provide a common drainage system. As will be noted subsequently, this assumption is fallacious. At one time in Pennsylvania
it was intimated that the owner of an urban lot was obligated to convey his surface water to a public drain. This dictum was subsequently overruled.30
Apparently the first case strongly recognizing the distinction
31
between urban and rural properties arose in Iowa, a civil law state.
Arkansas subsequently adopted a rule strongly favoring urban
development.3 2 Strangely, the cases most strongly expressing the
rural-urban distinction are from predominantly agricultural states.
In Kansas an unusual situation arose because of a statute abolishing the common enemy rule concerning surface waters. The
plaintiff in Liston v. Scott 33 had maintained a retaining wall at the
rear of his premises to ward off water. The defendant constructed
a higher retaining wall and filled his lot, causing water from a roof
to drain onto the plaintiff's land. An order sustaining the defendant's demurrer was affirmed. The court held that the statute abolishing the common enemy rule applied only to rural areas.
Even though more liberal rules apply to urban property, it
appears to be universally stated that an upper proprietor cannot
accumulate or concentrate water into artificial channels and discharge it upon his neighbor.34 Furthermore, at least in California, a
special rule applies to waters in those intermittent watercourses
which handle storm waters after heavy rains. Such waters are not
surface waters; nor are they in a natural watercourse. One cannot
lawfully cast such waters upon the land of another to his damage.
In making provisions for such waters, however, a municipality
will not 35be liable if acting reasonably upon the basis of past experience.
Alabama has a long line of cases dealing with the distinction
between urban and rural areas. These cases illustrate the difficulty
which has been experienced in finding the proper rule for the
development of urban areas. Initially, the court boldly held that
urban property may be improved without liability. 36 At that time
Alabama was declared to generally follow the civil law rule. This
initial urban case was modified by subsequent decisions holding
that an upper proprietor cannot alter the natural drainage so as to
increase the total area to which the lower is servient.3 7 It was also
implied that the development of a lot by a lower proprietor, so as
to impede drainage, must be reasonable and natural. 3 Subsequently,
it was determined that "the only basis for liability in such cases
is to be found in a wrongful or negligent exercise of the right" to
30 Reilly v. Stephenson, 222 Pa. 252, 70 Al. 1097 (1908). Compare Chamberline v. Ciaffoni,
373 Pa. 430, 96 A.2d 140 (1953).
31 Phillips v. Waterhouse, 60 Iowa 199, 28 N.W. 539 (1886).
32 Timmons v. Clayton, 222 Ark. 327, 259 S.W.2d 501 (1953); Levy v. Nash, 87 Ark. 41, 112
S.W. 173 (1908).
33 108 Kan. 180, 194 Pac. 642 (1921).
34 Jaxon v. Clapp, 45 CaI.App. 214, 187 Pac. 69 (Dist. Ct. App. 1919); 93 C.J.S. Waters § 116 (c)
(1956).
35 Los Angeles Cemetery Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 103 Cal. 461, 37 Pac. 375 (1894); Weck
v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 104 Cal.App.2d 599, 232 P.2d 293 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951).
36 Hall v. Rising, 141 Ala. 433, 37 So. 586 (1904).
In this case the lower proprietor impeded
drainage by filling his lot.
37 Perry v. McCrow, 226 Ala. 400, 147 So. 178 (1933); Southern Ry. v. Lewis, 165 Ala. 555, 51
So. 746 (1910).
38 Shahan v. Brown, 179 Aia. 425, 60 So. 891 (1913).
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impede drainage. 39 Finally, two recent companion cases demonstrated that a different policy applies to upper proprietors as contrasted to lower proprietors in urban areas. 40 The defendant had.
developed a subdivision which included a system of drains alleged
to cast water upon the plaintiffs, who were owners of lower ground.
The right of lo Wier proprietors in urban areas to obstruct drainage
was reaffirmed. However, the court said that the liability of an
upper proprietor for collecting surface waters and casting them
upon the lower is not affected by whether the area is within an
incorporated town or city. The degree of care exercised by the
developer is immaterial. Liability exists for concentrating surface
water and casting it upon a lower owner to his damage, when, if
it were not so collected, it would be scattered and diffused. In
Alabama then, the civil law 41
doctrine appears to apply without
exception to upper proprietors.
In passing from the subject of the rural-urban distinction, it
must be noted that basic principles of torts42 may create liabilities
superimposed upon specific drainage law.

G. Application of Rules to Residential Subdivisions
Problems incident to the development of large-scale residential
subdivisions require special consideration. Since these developments
take place in previously rural areas, the vital question is whether
one can, by changing the use of his land, alter legal duties to his
neighbor. Apparently, the issue has been faced squarely in only
43
one case, Rau v. Wilden Acres, Inc.

In the course of subdividing

his land, the defendant constructed a drainage ditch in a swale
leading onto the plaintiff's land. Both tracts were formerly rural
property, and the court indicated that the matter should be treated
accordingly. This ruling was unnecessary to the case, for the court
applied the generally applicable rule that one may not collect
waters in an artificial channel and cast them upon another's property. As noted, this holds true in either rural or urban areas. 44
Accordingly, an injunction was granted. In contrast, a subsequent
case from the same jurisdiction intimated that the rules governing
urban areas should be applied initially to subdivision developers. 45
The issue remains in doubt.
Two recent cases having virtually identical facts, with opposing
results, highlight the different approaches to the problems posed
by subdivisions. In both cases the developer had installed a system
of storm drains which discharged into a natural watercourse traversing the plaintiff's property. The increased flow in both instances
resulted in erosion of land along the stream. New Jersey, applying
its reasonable use rule, required the defendant to pipe the entire
stream to an outlet on a lake. 46 In so doing, the court commented:

39 Ex porte Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co., 206 Ala. 403, 90 So. 876 (1921).
40 Kay-Noo in Dev. Co. v. Kinzer, 259 Ala. 49, 65 So.2d 510 (1953); Kay-Nooiin Dev. Co. v.
Hockett, 253 A a. 588, 45 So.2d 792 (1950).
41 Vinson v. Turner, 252 Ala. 271, 40 So.2d 863 (1949).
42 See, for example, the annotation concernina overflow or escape of water from excavation
mode in the course of construction, 23 A.L.R.2d 827 (1952).
43376 Pa. 493, 103 A.2d 422 (1954).
44 Since such subdivisions normally contain some system of drains, this rule may find frequent
application. For a similar case see Hodges Manor Corp. v. Mayflower Park Corp., 197 Va. 344,
89 S.E.2d 59 (1955). Here the "artificial channel" rule was recognized as an exception to Virginia's
modified common enemy approach.
45 Leiper v. Heywood-Hall Constr. Co., 381 Pa. 317, 113 A.2d 148 (1955).
46 Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956).
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"The issue of reasonableness or unreasonableness becomes a question of fact to be determined in each. case upon a consideration of
all the relevant circumstances, including such factors as the amount
of harm caused, the foreseeability of the harm which results, the
purpose or motive with which the possessor acted, and all other
relevant matter. ' 47 The New Jersey court also took the position
that the economic burden of the expulsion of surface waters from
areas being developed for urban use should be borne by those
who are in the business for profit rather than by adjoining landowners.
The same facts appeared in Colorado, 48 which follows a modi-

fied civil law doctrine. The defendant was not charged with negligence. The basis for the appellate decision, which affirmed the
judgment for the defendant, was that a natural watercourse may
be used as a conduit for the drainage of lands, at least where the
augmented flow will not tax the stream beyond its capacity and
cause the flooding of lower lands. By implication, acceleration of
erosion does not constitute taxing a stream beyond its capacity.
II.

MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

The second major aspect of urban drainage law involves the
bases of liability against municipal corporations for faulty drainage. 49 The importance of this topic is indicated by the fact that in
every modern community throughout the world the storm drainage
problem is regarded and undertaken as a municipal function.50
The potential theories of liability advanced against municipal
corporations are numerous: negligent planning or construction;
negligent maintenance; nonfeasance by failure to correct known
inadequacies; positive interference with natural drainage, including
obstruction by roads; eminent domain; nuisance and other absolute
liabilities. Each of these bases receives separate consideration hereafter.
A. Negligent Planning or Construction
As a general proposition, municipal corporations are not liable
for mere failure to provide drainage systems. Nor are they liable
for negligence in the initial planning of storm water disposal. 51 The
establishment of a drainage system is a discretionary exercise of
legislative power, with which the courts cannot interfere. 52 If a
party has constructed improvements below a legally established
grade, a city is almost certainly not bound to protect him. 53
On the other hand, a city may be held liable for negligence in
the course of construction, as distinguished from design. 54 This is a
47 Id. at 330, 120 A.2d at 10.
48 Ambrosio v. PerI-Mack Constr. Co., 143 Colo. 49, 351 P.2d 803 (1960).
49 An excellent general discussion of this aspect may be found in 18 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations §§ 53.117-53.144 (3d ed. 1950).
50 In comparison to sanitary sewers, storm drains are expensive because of their large capacity.
Los Angeles County, after spending $179,000,000 on storm drains to relieve local flooding, needs
additional storm drains costing about a billion dollars to provide adequate relief from local floods
and to protect areas as yet undeveloped. Engineering News-Record, March 13. 1958, p. 28.
51 18 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations J 53.121 (3d ed. 1950); City of Englewood v. Linkenheil,
362 P.2d 186 (Colo. 1961); Denver v. Rhodes, 9 Colo. 554, 13 Pac. 729 (1887); Daniels v. City of
Denver, 2 Colo. 669 (1875); Martinez v. Cook, 56 N.M. 343, 244 P.2d 134 (1952).
52 Martinez v. Cook, 56 N.M. 343, 244 P.2d 134 (1952).
53 Denver v. Stanley Aviation, 143 Colo. 182, 352 P.2d 291 (1960); Aicher v. City of Denver, 10
Colo.App. 413, 52 Pac. 86 (1897).
54 Denver v. Rhodes, 9 Colo. 554, 13 Pac. 729 (1887); Gibson v. State, 187 Misc. 931, 64 N.Y.S.2d
632 (Ct. CI. 1946). The former case held the city liable where earth thrown up temporarily in the
course of sewer excavation created in effect a dam across the street, causing flooding after a heavy
rain.
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purely proprietary action which does not call for the exercise of
governmental discretion. It appears that this rule has been applied
to hold a city '55
liable for faults in design, calling the defect one of
"construction.
The distinction requires close observance.
There are two principal exceptions to the statement that a city
is not liable for failure to provide drainage or for negligence in
planning. If, as a result of the city's affirmative acts, additional
waters are cast upon the plaintiff's land, then there is liability for
negligent adoption of a plan. Also, if the city abandons a drain, it
will be liable where property is thereby left in a worse position
than it was before construction of a drain. 56 The liability for positive misfeasance applies not only to drainage of surface waters but
also to alterations in surface watercourses. If the municipality
action
should know that its actions will result in increased erosion,
57
must be taken reasonably calculated to avoid that result.

Negligent Maintenance and Failure to Correct Inadequacies
a city is
On the other hand, it is generally acknowledged that
liable for negligence in maintenance of existing sewers. 58 However,
in Georgia, maintenance of sewers has been held to be a governmental function for which there is no liability based on negligence. 59
One vital question which arises here is whether a city may be liable
for continuing to maintain a storm sewer, with actual knowledge
of its inadequacy. As noted above, the city is not liable for planning
an inadequate system. But liability may be predicated upon failure
to correct that inadequacy after it has been demonstrated by experience. 0
The next question which naturally arises in this connection is
whether a city must have a program of inspection and preventive
maintenance. Logically, the issue would resolve into whether a
reasonable man, in the exercise of due care, would inspect. Beyond
B.

55 City of Ashland v. Kittle, 305 S.W.2d 768 Ky. Ct. App. 1957).
56 Cattin v. Omaha, 149 Neb. 434, 31 N.W.2d 300 (1943); Martinez v. Cook, 56 N.M. 343, 244
P.2d 134 (1952); Gibson v. State, 187 Misc. 931, 64 N.Y.S.2d 632 (Ct. Cl. 1946).
57 Kidde Mfg. Co. v. Bloomfield, 20 N.J. 52, 118 A.2d 535 (1955).
58 Malvernia Inv.'Co. v. Trinidad, 123 Colo. 394, 229 P.2d 945 (1951); Denver v. Copelli, 4 Colo.
29 (1877); True v. Mayor of Westernport, 196 Md. 280, 76 A.2d 135 (1950); City of Meridian v.
Sullivan, 209 Miss. 61, 45 So.2d 851 (1950); Sigurdson v. Seattle, 48 Wash.2d 155, 292 P.2d 214
(1956); McCabe v. City of Parkersburg, 138 W.Va. 830, 79 S.E.2d 87 (1953).
59 Foster v. Savannah, 77 Ga.App. 346, 48 S.E.2d 686 (1948).
60 Denver v. Mason, 88 Colo. 294, 295 Pac. 788 (1931); Cannon v. City of Macon, 81 Ga.App.
310, 58 S.E.2d 563 (1950). Contra, Bratonjo v. Milwaukee, 3 Wis.2d 120, 87 N.W.2d 775 (1958),
holding that mere inadequacy, na-matter how obvious it becomes, can never be the basis for
liability. See annot., 70 A.L.R. 1347 (1931), "Liability of municipality where sewer originally of
ample size has become inadequate by growth or development of territory."
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that it must be determined what constitutes a reasonable inspection
and preventive maintenance program. These issues seem to be factual in nature. Nevertheless, most of the decisions on this question
indicate that the city must have an inspection and periodic maintenance program. B1 The city must take notice of such conditions as
ordinary care will discover. As expressed in one case, the city is
bound to take notice of the susceptibility
of timbers or other ma62
terials to deteriorate from time and use.

Does the occurrence of sewer stoppage raise a presumption that
the city has failed in its duty of inspection and maintenance? In
one instance it was held that there must be proof of the nature of
the obstruction, in order to show that it was something which
should have been anticipated or which periodic inspection would
have disclosed.63 On the other hand, such circumstances have been
viewed as
64 proper for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur.
Some states have statutes prohibiting civil actions against a
city arising because of defective conditions unless written notice
of the condition is given to the authorities before the damage occurs.
Such a statute was avoided in interesting fashion.in one New York
case.65 It was alleged that the city controlled the drains and that,
by reason of negligence in maintenance, overflow upon the plaintiff's property had been caused. The court observed that prior notice
is not required where the alleged negligence is active in nature. It
was then observed that the city had undertaken to provide drains,
and, having done so, negligence in the performance of duties of
maintenance rendered the city liable without notice.
Ever since Rylands v. Fletcher,66 the law has viewed with a
jaundiced eye any party who impounds large quantities of water.
Thus, in the course of protecting the city from surface water, if a
large quantity is impounded,
negligence at any stage will furnish
6 7
a basis for liability.
C. Positive Interference with Natural Drainage
Where a city takes action which interferes in a positive manner
with natural drainage conditions, it will be liable for damage thereby resulting to private property. 68 A special instance of this liability
may occur when a city illegally and improperly establishes or
changes a high street grade so as to obstruct drainage. 69 Normally,
the establishment of a street grade requires approval by ordinance.
In Brown v. Sigourney,70 an action was brought for damages caused
when the city raised the level of the street, resulting in an accumulation of water on plaintiff's land. In affirming judgment for the
plaintiff, the court said:
So far as the record shows there is no established grade for
61 Yearsley v. City of Pocatello, 69 Idaho 500, 210 P.2d 795 (1949); City of Meridian v. Bryant,
232 Miss. 892, 100 So.2d 860 (1958); Scamp v. State, 189 Misc. 802, 70 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Ct. Cl. 1947).
62 Dunn v. Boise City, 48 Idaho 538, 283 Pac. 609 (1929).
63 Lobster Pot v. City of Lowell, 333 Mass. 31, 127 N.E.2d 659 (1955).
64 Anello v. Kansas City, 286 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955).
65 Randle v. City of Rome, 195 N.Y.S.2d 373 (Oneida County Ct. 1960).
66 L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
67 Hogan v. Hot Springs, 58 N.M. 220, 269 P.2d 1102 (1954).
68 Andrew Jergens Co. v. Los Angeles, 103 Cal.App.2d 232, 229 P.2d 475 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951),
in which water from a 500 acre area would be funneled onto the plaintiff's land.
69 63 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 1227 (1950).
70 164 Iowa 184, 145 N.W. 478 (1914).
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the streets of the city of Sigourney. Such [can be done]
only by means of an ordinance. .

.

.When the grade is so

established, streets may be changed in their height to conform to it without creating liability for resulting damages.
But until a grade is so established a city may not make
changes in the surface of the street resulting in damages
to adjacent
property owners without being liable for the
71
same.
72
A number of other cases support this position.
McQuillin takes the view that a city should not be liable for
the unauthorized acts of its agents if the city would not be liable
if acting properly. 73 Nevertheless, an adjacent property owner cannot rely upon an illegally established grade in improving his property.74 The alteration of a street level is not some casual caprice of

a minor official of which the responsible parties may claim ignorance. It would therefore seem just to impose liability upon the city
for the obstruction which its agents have erected.
If a grade is properly established, then there can be no liability
for mere obstruction of surface drainage. 75 But if it can be shown
that the road constitutes a trap or funnel, collecting and discharging water on private property, liability again may be predicated
upon the positive action of the municipality. 76 Furthermore, it is

incumbent upon a municipality, in crossing a natural watercourse
an adequate culvert or other means for the
with a road, to provide
77
passage of water.
D. Eminent Domain
Still another potential basis for liability is found in the recovery
of consequential damages in eminent domain proceedings. It is
recognized as a general rule that "where land is flooded, or its
drainage prevented, by the obstruction of the flow of water, or its
diversion from its natural channel, there is, in general, such a taking
or injury as entitles the owner to compensation, although the improvement causing the injury was authorized by the legislature."75
Obstruction of drainage occasionally results from new highway or
street construction. The resulting injury to private property is an
in eminent domain. 7i
item which is to be considered in proceedings
In Board of County Comm'rs v. Adler,80 the county had caused the
flooding of plaintiff's lands when, in constructing a bridge across
the Platte River, it had filled up certain of its channels. This caused
a backwater effect in time of flood which inundated the land in
question. Recovery for this damage was allowed even though the
71 Id. at 186, 145 NW. at 479.
72 Gonzalez v. Pensacola, 65 Fla. 241, 61 So. 503 (1913); Delphi v. Evans, 36 Ind. 90, 10 Am.Rep.
12 (1871); Blandon v. Fort Dodge, 102 Iowa 441, 71 N.W. 411 (1913); Richardson v. Webster City,
Ill Iowa 427, 82 N.W. 920 (1900); Trustees of P.E. Church v. Anamosa, 76 Iowa 538, 41 N.W. 313
(1889); Radcliffe v. Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 195, 53 Am.Dec. 357 (1850); Smith v. Cincinnati, 4 Ohio 514
(1831); Meinzer v. City of Racine, 74 Wis. 166, 42 N.W. 230 (1889); Crossett v. Janesville, 28 Wis.
420 (1871).
73 13 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations 592 (3d ed. 1950).
74 Leadville v. McDonald, 67 Colo. 131, 186 Pac. 715 (1919).
75 Scamp v. State, 189 Misc. 802, 70 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Ct. Cl. 1947); Lynch v. Mayor, 76 N.Y. 60,
32 Am.Rep. 271 (1879).
76 Sheehan v. Richmond County, 100 Ga.App. 496, 111 S.E.2d 924 (1959); Lynch v. Mayor, 76
N.Y. 60, 32 Am.Rep. 271 (1879).
77 Board of County Comm'rs v. Adler, 69 Colo. 290, 194 Pac. 621 (1920); Powelson v. Seattle,
87 Wash. 617, 152 Pac. 329 (1915).
78 29 C.J.S.Eminent Domain 1 117 (1941).
79 Board of Comm'rs v. Noble, 117 Colo. 77, 184 P.2d 142 (1947);Bockover v. Board of Supervisors, 13 S.D. 317, 83 N.W. 335 (1900).
80 Supra note 77.
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plaintiff's land did not abut upon the improvement. A slightly different question is presented when a municipal collection system
for storm waters tends to discharge water in a location where it
floods private property. There appears to be a division of authority
as to whether this action constitutes an injuring of private property
for public use.8'
E. Nuisance and Other Absolute Liabilities
Theories of nuisance have been applied as a basis for municipal
liability in appropriate instances, thereby avoiding the necessity
for proof of negligence. Where a city has created a condition which
results in the flooding of private property after each heavy rain,
only a temporary nuisance exists. Consequently, each subsequent
flooding creates a new cause of action, largely due to the impossibility of estimating damage to be suffered in the future.82 In some
cases it has been shown that, due to a defect in the system, storm
waters were able to percolate into sanitary sewers. The natural
consequence is an overtaxing of the sanitary sewer and the flooding
of private homes with filth. After repeated occasions, this constitutes a nuisance in every sense of the term.8 3 Of course, the condition must have persisted for a period of time sufficient to demonstrate that it is a recurrent interference with the enjoyment of
property.
A sewer system, once adequate, tends to become inadequate
and insufficient as a result of continued growth of the community.
Where this results in repeated instances of damage to private property, the city will be liable if, after notice of the nuisance, it fails
to adopt and execute measures necessary to correct the condition.84
81 City of Englewood v. Linkenheil, 362 P.2d 186 (Colo. 1961); City of Jackson v.
Miss. 201, 58 So.2d 498 (1952).
82 City of Tucson v. Apache Motors, 74 Ariz. 98, 245 P.2d 255 (1952); City of Tucson
Motor Co., 64 Ariz. 240, 168 P.2d 245 (1946) (obstruction of natural watercourse by
culvert).
83 Pettinger v. Village of Winnebago, 239 Minn. 156, 58 N.W.2d 325 (1953); Clark
Springfield, 241 S.W.2d 100 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951).
84 City of Ado v. Conoy, 198 Okla. 206, 177 P.2d 89 (1947).
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Therefore, although a city is not liable for any initial failure to
adopt an adequate drainage plan, liability will result for continued
maintenance of a system which constitutes a private nuisance. 85
Municipal liability also exists, independent of negligence, where
water is artificially impounded or collected and then discharged
upon private property.8 6 Although the cases in such instances occasionally speak in terms of nuisance, it is unnecessary to show
recurrent injury with notice to the municipality.8 Even though
the liability is absolute, equity will not be required to grant an injunction where no substantial injury to the private property is
shown and great public detriment would result from discontinuance
of the sewer facilities.88
Since flooding as a result of the failure of municipal dams or
dikes occurs typically after unusually heavy rains, it is natural to
expect an "Act of God" to be alleged as a defense. In this respect,
the duty is thrust upon a city to anticipate such rainfalls as experience shows do occur occasionally, although at infrequent intervals.89
III. CONCLUSION
It must be remembered that the growth of urban civilization
results in a radical alteration of the natural drainage regimen. A
well-planned municipal drainage system is a necessity. Otherwise
a chaotic situation results, with each individual property owner
seeking- to protect his property as best he can. Yet, the courts have
recognized that in the process of planning and executing a drainage
system there exists an area of legislative discretion with which
they cannot interfere. A most interesting approach to the resulting
plight of the property owner has been adopted by a South Carolina
statute which is believed to be unique: "Whenever . . .it shall be
necessary or desirable to carry off the surface water from any
street, alley, or other public thoroughfare along such thoroughfare
rather than over private lands adjacent to or adjoining such thoroughfare, such municipality shall, upon demand from the owner
of such private lands, provide sufficient drainage...." 90 This statute
has been interpreted to require some positive act by the municipality which alters the natural drainage pattern before the property
owner has a right to demand that drainage be provided. 9' Thus, a
city is not liable to provide drainage if it merely annexes an area
in which roads are already constructed. 92 Nevertheless, this statute
appears to present a step in the right direction. The continuing
process of urbanization will render municipal drainage problems
increasingly important. It would appear to be time for the relative
rights and responsibilities of cities and property owners to be set
forth in systematic fashion.
85 Denver v. Mason, 88 Colo. 294, 295 Poc. 788 (1931).
86Willson v. Boise City, 20 Idaho 133, 117 Poc. 115 (1911); Woods v. State Centre, 249 Iowa
38, 85 N.W.2d 519 (1957); Wendel & Sons, Inc. v. Newark, 138 N.J.Eq. 69, 46 A.2d 793 (Ch. 1946);
Nolan v. Carr, 189 N.Y.S.2d 82 (Sup. C?. 1959); Dixon v. Nashville, 29 Tern.App. 282, 203 S.W.2d

178 (1946).

87 See, e.g., Dixon v. Nashville, 29 Tenn.App. 282, 203 S.W.2d 178 (1946).
88 Nolan v. Carr, 189 N.Y.S.2d 82 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
89 Willson v. Boise City, 20 Idaho 133, 117 Pac. 115 (1911).
90 S.C. Code § 59-224 (Supp. 1960).
91 Belue v. Greenville, 226 S.C. 192, 84 S.E.2d 631 (1954); Holliday v. Greenville, 224 S.C. 207,
78 S.E.2d 279 (1953).
92 Hill v. Greenville, 223 S.C. 392, 76 S.E.2d 294 (1953). Compare Macedonia Baptist Church v.
Columbia, 195 S.C. 59, 10 S.E.2d 350.(1940) where, as a result of several alterations in the drainage
pattern by the city, recovery was upheld.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ZONING
LAW IN COLORADO
By

MAXINE KuRTz*

The Colorado Supreme Court developed a significant body of
zoning law in the period from July, 1960 through the end of 1961.
This article is a review of this series of cases, of the relation of these
cases to earlier Colorado decisions, and to a limited extent, of the
Colorado position as compared to the law in the nation generally.
Zoning is the division of land into districts. The essence of zoning regulation is the control of use of land in these districts. Collateral regulations govern such subjects as the size and bulk of
buildings and the open space required on the site. This distinction
between use regulations and other regulations is recognized by
legislatively imposed limitations which deny the board of adjustment power to grant so-called "use variances," and which permit
the board to only grant variances in setbacks, bulk, and other
similar regulations." This distinction was also implicit in the majority opinion in the Denver Buick case,2 when the Colorado court
invalidated two districts with essentally the same use lists, but with
different requirements in other respects.
I.

ZONING AmENDMENT STANDARDS

One of the significant advances in Colorado zoning law in the
period under consideration was the evolution of standards for
measuring the validity of zoning amendments. Five tests were
established by the courts:
1. The amendment must promote a public purpose;
2. The amendment must further the comprehensive plan;
3. The denial of an amendment will not be deemed confiscatory if the price for the land as now zoned is greater
than the purchase price;
4. The denial of an amendment will not be deemed unreasonable or discriminatory solely because of the existence of limited numbers of nonconforming uses in the
zone; and
5. The denial of an amendment will not be deemed unreasonable solely because of proximity of the applicant's
land to a heavily traveled street or to different zoning
across such a street.
Although some of these matters were decided in cases prior to 1960,
the subjects were developed in detail in the recent cases.
*

June graduate, University of Denver College of Law.

1 E.g., Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code J 611.6-4(2) (a) (1956): " ...
No variance shall
be authorized hereunder unless the Board shall find that all of the following conditions exist: . . .
(a-1). That the variance will not authorize the operation of a use other than those uses specifically
enumerated as Uses by Right for the district in which is located the property for which the variance
is sought;
. . " See also Arnebergh, Variances (American Society of Planning Officials, Chicago,
mimeo, 1951).
2 City & County of Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc., 141 Colo. 121, 139, 347 P.2d 919, 930 (1960),
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A. Public Purpose
As an exercise of the police power, zoning is a tool to accomplish affirmative ends.3 The Colorado zoning enabling act for municipalities 4 and the Denver city charter' both provide:
Purposes in view.-Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan and designed to lessen
congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic and
other dangers; to promote health and general welfare; to
provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding
of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to facilitate
the adequate provisions of transportation, water, sewerage,
schools, parks and other public requirements. Such regulations
shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other
things, as to the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the
value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of
land throughout [such municipality].
The statute and the charter provisions were enacted in the mid1920's and have not been amended since. Both were the result of a
standard enabling act. 6
A similar provision is found in the Colorado county zoning
enabling act 7 of 1939, and this, too, has not been amended. The

purposes in this instance are somewhat differently stated and are
considerably broader in scope:
Public welfare to be promoted.-Such regulations shall be
designed and enacted for the purpose of promoting the health,
safety, morals, convenience, order, prosperity or welfare of
the present and future inhabitants of the state, including the
lessening of congestion in the streets or roads or reducing the
waste of excessive amounts of roads, securing safety from fire
and other dangers, providing adequate light and air, classification of land uses, and distribution of land development and
utilization, protection of the tax base, securing economy in
governmental expenditures, fostering the state's agricultural
and other industries, and the protection of both urban and
nonurban development.
The court dealt squarely with the municipal zoning enabling
act in the case of Clark v. Boulder.' After quoting Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 139-60-3 (1953) in full, the court held an amendment to the city
zoning ordinance to be unconstitutional because it failed to promote
any of the statutory purposes.9
The earlier Colorado cases dealing with the subject of public
purpose in zoning are more than thirty years old. At the time when
most of these cases were decided, the United States Supreme Court
had not considered the issue, and Colorado was aligned with the
3 Colby v. Board of Adjustment, 81 Colo. 344, 351, 255 Poc. 443,446 (1927): "it was held in
Miller v. Board of Public Works, . . . to which we agree, that zoning ordinances have a much
wider scope than mere suppression of offensive uses of property, and act not only negatively, but
affirmatively for the promotion of the public welfare."
4Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-60-3 (1953).
5 Denver City Charter § 81.15 (1960 Compilation)..
6Advisory Committee on Zoning, United States Deportment of Commerce, A Standard State
Zoning Enabling Act Under Which Municipalities May Adopt Zoning Regulations §3 (Rev. ed. 1926).
7 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 106-2-16 (1953).
8362 P.2d 160 (Colo. 1961).
9 Id. at 163.
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states which held that the public purposes of zoning were not
strong enough to support zoning legislation.
In the 1910 case of Curran Bill Posting & Distrib. Co. v. City of
Denver,10 the court could find no public necessity for a provision
prohibiting the erection of billboards within 10 feet of a structure,
and commented that this "is an unwarranted invasion of private
rights and cannot be tolerated."'"
Three years later, in the case of Willison v. Cooke,12 the court
was reviewing a Denver ordinance establishing a residential district, within which the establishment of a business or a change of
the prevailing setback lines required neighborhood consent. Plaintiff wanted to build a business building on the corner of E. Colfax
Ave. (a major highway) and Williams St. (a minor street) without
taking any setback on Williams St. and without securing any consents. The court held: "A store building in a residence section of the
city is not desirable from an aesthetic point of view; but restrictions
for this purpose alone cannot be upheld, as it is only those having
for their object the safety and welfare of the public which justifies
restricting a use of property by the owner."u3 The court also held
that the setback had no relation to public welfare. The result was
one commonly reached in situations of this kind, but the ground
has usually been considered an invalid delegation of legislative
authority to a small group of citizens.
The first of the Hedgcock cases, decided in 1932,14 related to a
different ordinance, but the facts were similar. Plaintiff wanted
to build a business building on the corner of E. Colfax and Adams
St. and did not want to comply with a prevailing setback line on
Adams St. The court cited the Willison case 15 as controlling and
added: "We are not unmindful that the Willison case was decided
before the enactment of the zoning ordinance invoked by Williams
in justification of his act, but we note no difference in principle."1 6
The 1924 Weicker case 17 involved a Denver ordinance requiring
approval by the city council for specified uses, including a construction of a warehouse. In this case, the plaintiff wanted to erect a
warehouse on East Colfax Ave. and Vine St. The council refused
the permit and specified five grounds for the decision. These related
to the building being dark at night, the noise, the excessive height
of the building, the added danger of pests and rodents, and the
congregation of children around warehouses to the detriment of
the public morals. Clearly, this was an attempt by the city council
to provide a basis for a determination of public purpose for the
regulation. The court, in a brief decision, refuted the findings of
the city council and observed that insofar as the height limits were
concerned, an ordinance of general applicability was needed to
have valid regulations.
Of the four cases cited above, three were decided before the
10 47 Colo. 221, 107 Pac. 261 (1910).
11 Id. at 230, 107 Pac. at 265.
12 54 Colo. 320, 130 Pac. 828 (1913).
13 Id. at 329, 130 Pac. at 832.
14 Hedgcock v. People ex rel. Reed, 91 Colo. 155, 13 P.2d 264 (1932).
15 Willison v. Cooke, supro note 12.
16 Supra nete 14, at 158, 13 P.2d at 264.
17 Weicker Transfer & Storage Co. . Council of City & County of Denver, 75 Colo. 475, 226 Pac.
857 (1924).
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United States Supreme Court upheld zoning ordinances in 1926,18
and before Colorado upheld zoning in this state in the following

year. 19 Although the reasoning in these early cases was rejected
by the United States Supreme Court, 20 the Colorado court in the
Colby case commented: "Even so, we do not apprehend that we
are now offending the rule of stare decisis, as applied to any of

our previous decisions. We are only applying old principles to new

conditions, or to the changed facts of modern life.''21 The cases of
Beszedes v. Board of Comm'rs,22 decided in 1947, and Hoskinson V.
Arvada,23 decided in 1957, differentiated the Willison, Hedgcock,
and Weicker cases, essentially limiting them to their facts. Nevertheless, the majority opinion in the Denver Buick case,2 4 decided
in 1960, cited the Willison and Hedgcock cases as precedent.
Nationally, the public purpose doctrine of the Clark case is well
recognized.25 As a philosophical proposition, this recognition of the
interest of the general public in zoning matters would seem to be
the better position from a constitutional standpoint. The source of
the zoning power is the police power, and usually it is exercised for
the general welfare. (See for example the quotation from the Colorado county zoning enabling act above.) The alternative position
is logically either legislative mediation of disagreement on land use
between adjacent land owners or legislation for the private benefit
of individuals. In either event, the resultant legislation is basically
26
private legislation, and probably invalid.
B.

Furtherance of the Comprehensive Plan
As noted earlier, both the city enabling act and the Denver
city charter require that the zoning be in accordance with a comprehensive plan. In the standard wording quoted therein, the use
of the conjunctive "and" would indicate that requiring the zoning
ordinance to be in accordance with a comprehensive plan is a
separate requirement in addition to the requirement that a public
purpose be served. When the comprehensive plan is not found,
the inconsistent amendment is termed a "spot zone. ' 27 Spot zoning
is invalid in Colorado, according to a series of three recent decisions.
In the 1959 case of Holly Dev., Inc. v. Board of County
Comm'rs,28 the court was dealing with a proposed increase in
18 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
19 Colby v. Board of Adjustment, 81 Colo. 344, 255 Pac. 443 (1927).
20 Supra note 18, at 390-95. While the Colorado cases are not specifically cited by the Supreme
Court in the group stating the narrow view, the trial court cited the Willison case as being in this
group (297 Fed. 317).
21 Colby v. Board of Adjustment, supra note 19, at 353, 255 Pac. at 446. Compare the similar
comment by the United States Supreme Court in the Euclid case, 272 U.S. at 386.
22 116 Colo. 123, 128, 178 P.2d 950, 953 (1947).
23 136 Colo. 450, 453, 319 P.2d 1090, 1092 (1957).
24 City & County of Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc., 141 Colo. 121, 131, 132, 347 P.2d 919, 926,
927 (1960).
25 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.19 (3d ed. rev. 1957, and Supp. 1961); 1 Metzenbaum,
Zoning § 88 (2d ed. 1955 and Supp. 1961); 2 Metzenboum, Zoning § 1517(2d ed. 1955 and Supp.
1961); 1 Rathkopf, Zoning and Planning § 2-2 (3d ed. 1960); Rhyne, Municipal Law 811 (1957);
58 Am. Jur. Zoning §§ 25, 26 (1948); 101 CJ.S. Zoning § 2 (1958).
26 E.g., Colo. Const. art. V, § 25.
27 Clark v. Boulder, 362 P.2d 160, 162 (1961). See also 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations 5
25.83 (3d ed. rev. 1957, and Supp. 1961); 1 Metzenboum, Zoning 521, 538 (2d ed. 1955, ond Supp.
1961); 2 Metzenbaum, Zoning § 1517 (2d ed. 1955, and Supp. 1961); 1 Rathkopf, Zoning and Plan.
ning ch. 26 (3d ed. 1960); Rhyne, Municipal Law 825 (1957); 1 Yokely, Zoning Law and Practice §§
90-95 (2d ed. 1953, and Supp. 1961); Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 263 (1957); 58 Am. Jur. Zoning J 39 (1948);
101 C.J.S. Zoning § 34 (1958); 39A Words and Phrases 535, "Spot zone," "Spot zoning" (1953, Supp.
1961).
28 140 Colo. 95, 342 P.2d 1032 (1959).
See also Levy v. Board of Adjustment, 369 P.2d 991
(Colo. 1962).
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density of a residential area from 2
acres per dwelling unit to 1
acre per dwelling unit. Here the court pointed out that there had
been no change in conditions from the time when the comprehensive zoning plan was adopted, and that others in the viginity had
built relying upon the original zoning. Absent a change in conditions, the court declared, there was no justification for re-zoning
amendments.
This principle was carried one step further in the case of
Clark v. Boulder.29 (See map 1.) Here the owner had requested
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business zoning on several occasions, and had successively been
granted more and more dense residential zoning. Finally, he was
29 362 P.2d 160 (Colo. 1961).
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granted his business zoning on the fourth try. In this case, the court
pointed out that even though this zoning was an extension of an
existing business zone, the amendment had all the earmarks of being
a change for the benefit of the landowner, rather than a change
"in furtherance of the comprehensive plan." As a spot-zone, this
amendment was invalid.
30
In the most recent case, Board of County Comm'rs v. Shaffer,
with
lower
confronted
the Colorado Supreme Court found itself
court decrees allowing four different zones at the intersection of
Wadsworth Blvd. and W. 35th Avenue in Jefferson County. (See
map 2.) Mr. Justice Day, writing the opinion for the court, pointed
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out with considerable emphasis that spot zoning is just as invalid
when the courts do it as when the legislative bodies do it.
Three earlier cases laid the ground work for these decisions:
Colby v. Board of Adjustment, 3 ' in 1927, City of Colorado Springs
v. Miller,32 in 1934, and Hoskinson v. City of Arvada,33 in 1957.
30
31
32
33

367 P.2d 751 (Colo. 1961).
81 Colo. 344, 255 Poc. 443 (1927).
95 Colo. 337, 36 P.2d 161 (1934).
136 Colo. 450, 319 P.2d 1090 (1957).
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The Colby case,3 4 as mentioned earlier, was important primarily
for its ruling on the issue of the constitutionality of zoning ordinances in Colorado. In this case, the plaintiff wanted to operate a
brickyard in a residential zone. The court noted the erection of a
nearby school and the presence of a "highly desirable residential
section" in the vicinity. In analyzing the situation, the court observed: "A full perspective, however, in a case like this, requires
not only that the present be depicted, but that the future be envisaged. The evidence shows that experience has demonstrated
that other localities within the city, at one time no more promising
than those surrounding the brickyard, are now exclusively residential districts, occupied with beautiful and costly homes. '35
In the Colorado Springs v. Miller case,3 6 Mr. Justice Holland,
writing for the court, pointed out:
It is not apparent from the record that Miller's property
has been singled out by the council or the board, for different application of the restrictions than that applied to any
other property so situated. Because the council or the board
did not do an unreasonable thing by exempting his comparatively small area of ground in the center of a residence
zone and permitting it to be treated as property in a commercial zone, he complains. His complaint, in this respect,
is as impressive as an argument in favor of the validity and
reasonableness of the ordinance as it relates to the general
37
scheme attempted to be established by the zoning process.
38
The Hoskinson case involved one acre of land in the midst of a
residential area, upon which land the plaintiff wanted to build a
shopping center. The court quotes the language set forth above
from the Miller case to dispose of the complaint that the ordinance
was discriminatory.
The first sentence of the quotation from the Miller case was
the court's basis for differentiating it from the second Hedgcock
34
35
36
37
38
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31.
31, at 351, 255 Pac. at 446.
32.
32, at 339, 36 P.2d at 162.
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case. 39 In the latter case, the court was dealing with a small business area at the intersection of East 23rd Ave. and Dexter St. in
Denver. The city had admitted that this property was treated
differently than other land similarly situated in Denver, because
this land was zoned for Residence A, when even smaller areas
developed for business use elsewhere in the city were all zoned
business. The court held that this discriminatory treatment was
erroneous, but went on to limit its ruling to the specific facts. This
ruling was an application of the familiar axiom that in any classification scheme, matters similar in character should be similarly
treated. Applied more specifically to the subject matter of zoning,
the rule might be stated as requiring that the comprehensive zoning
plan have definite standards for district mapping, uniformly applied
to the area being zoned. The provisions in the Denver zoning ordinance establishing minimum areas for the various zones 40 were
in part designed to meet this problem.
A minor problem in applying the criterion of "furtherance of
the comprehensive plan" is the determination of what constitutes
the comprehensive plan. Mr. Justice Sutton in the Clark case refers
to the overall zoning scheme. 41 Mr. Justice Day in the Shaffer
case, 42 discusses a plan as apparently a separate document. Early
writers, 43 and most courts 44 have held that the comprehensive
plan was embodied in the zoning ordinance and map. The emphasis
was on the word "comprehensive," and the tests were whether
or not the entire community was zoned, and whether or not the
ordinance encompassed all land uses. More recently, some of the
authorities on zoning law have suggested that the term "comprehensive plan" refers to a separate document, and that the zoning
ordinance per se is a legal device for executing that plan. 45 Some

recent statutes reflect this idea. 46 Colorado has not ruled on this
matter directly.
C. Limited Applicability of "Confiscatory" Zoning
The claim that a zone district is void because it violates the due
process clause 47 and the just compensation clause 48 of the constitution is used so often by plaintiffs complaining of their zoning that
the claim is almost automatically part of zoning cases.
In the recent case of Clark v. Boulder,49 Mr. Justice Sutton
disposed of the argument of confiscatory zoning by pointing out
tersely: "That property may not be used as profitably for residential
39 Hedgcock v. People ex 'el. Arden Realty & Inv.Co., 98 Colo. 522, 57 P.2d 891 (1936).
40 Denver, Colo.,Rev. Municipal Code F 618.2.3 (1956).
41 Clark v. Boulder, 362 P.2d 160, 162 (Colo. 1961).
42 Board of County Comm'rs v. Shoffer, 367 P.2d 751, 753 (Colo. 1961).
43 E.g., Bassett, Zoning 90 (2d ed. 1940); Metzenbaum, Zoning 20 (1930); Rathkopf, Planning and
Zoning § 7a (2d ed. 1949); Yokely, Zoning Law and Practice § 53 (1948).
44 Cases cited in 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.79 (3d ed. rev. 1957, and Supp. 1961);
1 Metzenbaum, Zoning 19 (2d ed. 1955, and Supp. 1961); 1 Rathkopf, Zoning and Planning ch. 9
(3d ed. 1960); 58 Am. Jur.Zoning §§ 27, 34 (1948); 101 C.J.S. Zoning §§ 30, 87 (1958).
45 Harr, In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1154 (1955). See also
McBride & Babcock, The "Master Plan"-A Statutory Prerequisite to a Zoning Ordinance, 12 Zoning
Digest (Z.D.) 353 (Nov. 1960); Harr & Mytelka, Planning and Zoning, 13 Z.D. 33 (Feb. 1961); Boebele,
Horse Sense About Zoning and the Master Plan, 13 Z.D. 209 (Aug. 1961).
. 46 Indiana Planning and Zoning Act, 10 Burns Ind. Stat. Anno. §§ 53-701 to 53-794 as amended
(1951, Supp. 1962); Washington 1959 County Planning Enabling Act, Wash. Sess. Laws 1959. See
also proposed Pennsylvania Zoning Act, and Proposal of Illinois State Bar Ass'n Zoning Comm.,
cited in McBride & Babcock, supra note 42. Contra West's Anno. Calif. Codes, Government: § 65803
(1955).
47 E.g., Colo. Const. art. II, 125; U.S. Const. amendment
XIV, § 1.
48 E.g., Colo. Const. art. II, § 15.
49 362 P.2d 160 (Colo. 1961).
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purposes as for commercial
use, furnishes no justification for special
' 50
treatment thereof.
The leading case among the recent decisions was decided at
about the same time as the Clark case. This was the case of Baum v.
City & County of Denver," ' in which the court dealt squarely with
the issue of what constitutes evidence of "confiscatory" zoning. In
this case, the plaintiff owned a full city block of land, bounded on
one side by Sheridan Boulevard, a regional highway, and on the
other three sides by minor streets. Plaintiff wanted to develop this
land as a shopping center, but it was zoned for single family residential use. In support of his claim of the unreasonableness and
confiscatory nature of the zoning, the plaintiff presented testimony
that the value of the property for residential purposes was between
$24,500 and $28,000; and that the value of the property for commercial purposes was between $100,000 and $125,000. He had also
testified that he had purchased the property seven years earlier
for $8,728. The court pointed out: "Since the Euclid decision courts
have held that the due process and just compensation clauses of
the Federal or State constitution do not require that a landowner
be permitted to make the best, maximum or most profitable use
of his property. 5 2 The opinion compared the purchase price of
$8,700 with the estimated value for residential development of
$28,000, and added: "Plaintiff's conclusion that such a substantial
increase in value is nevertheless confiscatory does violence to the
rules of logic and finds little support in legal principles. '53
In Frankel v. Denver,54 the petitioner presented evidence on
the difference in value between property zoned for single family
residential use and property zoned for apartments. The court noted
that the land had appreciated by 4 in value from the original
purchase price to the value under single family residence zoning,
and held the rule of the Baum case to be determinative of this issue.
The same issue was raised again a few months later in the
case of Board of County Comm'rs v. Shaffer.55 No dollar figures
were stated in the opinion, but apparently evidence was produced
showing that land would be more valuable if zoned for business
than if zoned for residence. In this opinion, the court held that the
ruling of the Baum case was determinative of this case as well.
Four earlier cases are in accord with this present position of
the court. The earliest was the 1927 case of Colby v. Board of Adjustment.5 6 In this case, the plaintiff claimed that his property was
being confiscated because of the residential zoning which prevented
its development as a brickyard. The court did not quote any figures,
but it compared the situation with the facts in the case of Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 57 which were very similar. The United States
Supreme Court held in that case that difference in value between
about $800,000 for a brickyard as compared to about $60,000 for
residential purposes was not confiscatory. The Colorado court
pointed out that the amount of the difference in the Hadacheck case
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Id. at 162.
363 P.2d 688 (Colo. 1961).
Id. at 693.
Ibid.
363 P.2d 1063 (Colo. 1961).
367 P.2d 751 (Colo. 1961).
81 Colo. 344, 255 Pac. 443 (1927).
239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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was "tremendously in excess of the loss claimed here." The Colorado court then ruled that the decision in the Hadacheck case was
controlling in the Colby case.
In the 1934 case of City of Colorado Springs v. Miller,5 the
plaintiff had presented evidence on the relative value if zoned for
residence and if zoned for business. (The figures were not set out
in the opinion.) The court observed:
The claim that the application of the ordinance to
Miller's property would amount to confiscation and deprive
him thereof without due process of law is without merit.
The evidence settles itself to one proposition, that is, the
only loss suffered by Miller is his being deprived of the
chance to profit by the increased value of his property for
business uses. To him the ordinance is satisfactory if it
deprives others of the same opportunity and thereby enhances his values, but wrong, if he is not allowed to be
made the exception. One who owns, or one who acquires,
property, must be ever mindful of the right of the state
or city to exercise its legislative authority for the common
good. The ordinance is not unreasonable as it relates to the
property involved.5 9
In the 1957 case of Hoskinson v. Arvada, ° the facts were similar
to those in the Miller case, and the court held that the rule of the
Miller case was determinative of the "confiscation" issue here.
The 1942 case of People ex rel. Friedmanv. Webber 6' indicated
that a drop in assessed value on the property of more than half
during the preceding twelve years was a factor taken into consideration in declaring the zoning to be confiscatory.
D. Effect of Non-Conforming Uses
In the Frankel case,6 2 the Colorado court established the rule:
"The existence of non-conforming uses within the R-1 district does
not affect the validity of the classification, particularly where such
uses are few in number. 6 3 This case involved a vacant lot between
58 95 Colo. 337, 36 P.2d 161 (1934).
59 Id. at 340, 36 P.2d at 162.
60 136 Colo. 450, 319 P.2d 1090 (1957).
61 110 Colo. 161, 132 P.2d 183 (1942).
It should be noted (1) that assessed value probably
should not be used as evidence of market value: Fort Collins Dev. Co. v. France, 41 Colo. 512, 522,
92 Pac. 953, 956 (1907); and (2) that it is questionable if the zoning was necessarily responsible
for the decline in value, considering the economic conditions during the period in question.
62 Frankel v. Denver, 363 P.2d 1063 (Colo. 1961).
63 Id. at 1065.
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two non-conforming apartment buildings in a single family residence zone. These were the only two non-conforming uses in an
area of approximately 3 blocks. (See map 3.) This degree of non-

ZONED
t.

121b

R-3

Are. r-

R-3
-

-

N
NO SCALE

0

Z.Ave. N

P

ZONED

R

25 SINGLE UNIT DWELLINGS IN THE AREA SO INDICATED
.SUBJECT
P RO0PE RT Y

ZONE
BOUNDARY

SKETCH MAP 3
FRANKEL V. DENVER
conformance was not deemed to be sufficient to establish the invalidity of the zoning classification.

DICTA

JULY-AuGUST, 1962

In the earlier case of City of Colorado Springs v. Miller,64 the
subject property was located between a store and an alley, with the
opposite corner being occupied by a building with dwelling units
on the upper floor, and business on the ground floor. (See map 4.)
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COLORADO SPRINGS V. MILLER
Here, too, the court held that the degree of non-conformance was
insufficient to make the residential zoning unreasonable.
In the leading early Colorado case of Colby v. Board of Adjustment,65 plaintiff's land was located near a non-conforming brickyard, the operations of which were blighting the immediate neighborhood. The court held that this did not constitute sufficient reason
to allow plaintiff also to operate a brickyard in the same residential
zone.
Three earlier cases dealt with the opposite side of the coin,
where the court found the degree of development to be such as to
have established a different character of the area than that found
by the legislative body.
In the "pre-Euclidian" zoning period, the court reviewed the
nature of land use along East Colfax Avenue, an interstate highway,
and determined that its strip commercial character precluded
certain limitations being imposed by the city council. 66 Essentially
the same conclusion was reached in the first Hedgcock case 67
(supra, sec. I-A), where the court found that a requirement for
business building setbacks had been habitually ignored, and hence
could not be enforced against the plaintiff. In the Webber case, 68
64 95 Colo. 337, 36 P.2d 161 (1934).
65 81 Colo. 344, 255 Pac. 443 (1927).
66 Weicker Transfer & Storage Co. v. Council of City & County of Denver, 75 Colo. 475, 226 Pac.
857 (1924).
67 Hedgcock v. People ex rel. Reed, 91 Colo. 156, 13 P.2d 264 (1932).
68 People ex ref. Friedman v. Webber, 110 Colo. 161, 132 P.2d 187 (1942).
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the court found concentrated commercial development along Colorado Boulevard and along East Eighth Avenue, and determined
thereby that a business zone was established in fact. (See map 5.)
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The second Hedgcock case"9 also dealt with the character of
an area, but the court's decision was based on discriminatory treatment, rather than unreasonableness because of excessive non-conformance.
The Colorado court's position in these cases is one commonly
held in the country.
The leading modern case is Lockard v. City of
70
Los Angeles.
E. Effect of Adjacent Heavily Traveled Street
A perennial problem in urban areas is posed by the sequence
of a street being improved (such as Colorado Boulevard, 71 Federal
Boulevard,72 or Sheridan Boulevard7 3), followed by a marked increase in traffic, and followed in turn for demands for re-zoning
of already substantially developed single family residence areas
abutting this street. The usual demand is for business although
the business use often is uneconomic if allowed to develop. The
problem becomes more acute when business zoning already exists
across the street.
All of these factors were present in the Baum case74 where the
plaintiff wanted to erect a shopping center in a residence zone, on
property which abutted Sheridan Boulevard, and where Jefferson
County had business development and zoning on the opposite side
of the street. Here the court held that the decision as to the proper
zoning basically inhered in the legislative body, and that these facts
69 Hedgcock v. People ex rel. Arden Realty & Inv. Co., 98 Colo. 522,
70 33 Cal.2d 453, 202 P.2d 38. 7 A.L.R.2d 990 (1949).
71 Widened in average curb-to-curb mat width from about 48 feet
72 Widened in average curb-to-curb mat width from about 40 feet to
73 Widened in average curb-to-curb mat width from between 30
48 feet.
74 Baum v. Denver, 363 P.2d 688, 695 (Colo. 1961).

57 P.2d 891 (1936).
to approximately 84 feet.
approximately 60 feet.
and 40 feet to approximately
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alone did not warrant invalidating the residential zoning. (See
map 6.)
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The same general situation was in effect in the Shaffer case,
where improvements to Wadsworth Boulevard had greatly increased traffic. No business zoning existed at the intersection. Here
the court observed: "[H]eavy traffic on an adjoining street is insufficient to establish the unreasonableness of residential classification." 76 (See map 2 supra.)
In these cases, the court cites the long line of Illinois cases
75 Board of County Comm'rs v. Shaffer, 367 P.2d 751 (Colo. 1961).
76 Id. at 754.
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modern
which have developed this rule, 7T and also the leading
7 8
Michigan case of Robinson v. City of Broomfield Hills.

Many other Colorado cases have considered these facts, but
without establishing any general rules on the subject. Probably
the major Colorado case inconsistent in result with these modern
cases is the Webber case.7 9 (See map 5 supra.) Here the court noted
the business across the street, and to the north, and noted the heavy
traffic on Colorado Boulevard as considerations supporting the
granting of relief to the plaintiff.

II.

RELATION OF ZONING TO RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

As a matter of law, restrictive covenants are agreements between or among private property owners, for their mutual benefit.
Zoning, on the other hand, is a governmental exercise of the police
power for the welfare of the public (supra, sec. I-A). Commonly,
the courts of the country have ruled that the two are not related,
and zoning is in no way limited by the restrictive covenant. 80
Colorado has not ruled upon this point.
The general subject of the relation of zoning to restrictive
covenants appeared to be at issue in two recent cases, but no
definitive law was therein established. The 1960 case of Nelson v.
Farr8 raised this issue, and the trial court enjoined the city of
Greeley from zoning the land inconsistently with the restrictive
covenant. The supreme court, in dealing with the issue, found that
the restrictive covenant did not apply to the subject land.
The other case, Wellman v. Haug,82 had both restrictive covenants and zoning at issue, but they were handled as separate issues,
and no interrelationship between the two was considered by the
court.
III. EFFECT OF ZONING ON OTHER UNITS OF GOVERNMENT
The case of Reber v. South Lakewood Sanitation Dist.83 dealt
with the proposal of a sanitation district in Jefferson County to
build a sewage disposal plant in a residential neighborhood. The
zoning ordinance neither allowed nor prohibited the construction
of the plant, but provided that the board of adjustment could permit the plant to be built in such districts when required for the
public health. The district made a special appearance before the
board of adjustment, to challenge the jurisdiction of the board. The
district's challenge was overruled, and the board denied the permit.
The district appealed to the court. The district court conducted a
triaf de novo on the issues of necessity and location of the plant,
and overruled the board. The discussion of the facts by the supreme
court is somewhat confusing because of the further statutory requirement for planning board review of the location of proposed
77 LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. City of Chicago, 6 Ifl.2d 22, 126 N.E.2d 643 (1955); Herzog Building
Corp. v. City of Des Plaines, 3 111.2d 206, 119 N.E.2d 732 (1954); Kinney v. City of Joliet, 411 III.
289, 103 N.E.2d 473 (1952); Mundelein Estates Inc. v. Village of Mundelein, 409 111. 291, 99 N.E.2d
144 (1951).
78 350 Mich. 425, 86 N.W.2d 166 (1957).
79 People ex rel. Friedman v. Webber, 110 Colo. 161, 132 P.2d 187 (1942).
80 V McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.09 (3d ed. rev. 1957, and Supp. 1961); 2 Metzenbaum,
Zoning 1109 (2d ed. 1955, and Supp. 1961); 1 Rathkopf, Zoning and Planning ch. 74 (3d ed. 1960);
Rhyne, Municipal Law § 32.34 (1957); 1 Yokely, Zoning Law and Practice § 35 (2d ed. 1953, and
Supp. 1961); 58 Am. Jur. Zoning J 4 (1948); 101 C.J.S. Zoning §§ 39, 140 (1958).
81 143 Colo. 423, 354 P.2d 163 (1960).
82 360 P.2d 972 (Colo. 1961).
83 362 P.2d 877 (Colo. 1961).
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public facilities. 84 However, the court based its affirmation of the
district court ruling on the enabling act for the establishment of
sanitation districts, 85 and stated the rule as follows:
The relationship which the General Assembly established by C.R.S. '53, 106-2-9, as amended by chapter 193
of the Session Laws of 1959, is a relationship which has
been found to exist by courts even without such definite
statutory direction as found in the statute. In the absence
of such statute, courts of last resort have recognized that
districts, authorities and other state authorized governmental subdivisions have the power to overrule or disregard the
restrictions of county or municipal zoning regulations. 6
As is well evidenced by the numerous cases cited by the court in
support of this statement, the general rule is commonly applied.87
In some jurisdictions, proprietary functions of one unit of government are subject to the zoning authority of another, while the
governmental functions are not.88
However, some argument can be made against the general rule.
Assuming, as was true in the instant case, that the district had
alternative means of accomplishing the sewage disposal function
for which it was created, should the district be completely free to
select any system which it deems in its own best interest, irrespective of the damage which might be caused by the selection which
it made (even if it remains liable in law for responding in money
damages for the nuisance it creates) ?
Under facts like those in the principal case, there are two local
subdivisions of government, a county and a special district; both
have their grants of authority by legislative enactment; one is
charged with a rather broad and comprehensive concern with the
public welfare, the other is charged with a strictly limited concern.
Is the general welfare better served by giving the limited governmental (or "quasi-governmental" as it is sometimes called) juris84 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 106-2-9 (Supp. 1960).
85 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 89-5-1 (1953).
86 Supra note 83, at 879.
8T Decatur Park Dist. v. Becker, 368 III. 422, 14 N.E.2d 490 (1938); Puhr v. Kansas City, 142
Kan. 704, 51 P.2d 911 (1935); In re Petition, City of Detroit, 308 Mich. 480, 14 N.W.2d 140 (1944);
State ex ref. Askew v. Kopp, 330 S.W.2d 886 (Mo. 1960); State ex ref. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v.
Farrss, 340 S.W.2d 896 (Mo. 1957); Aviation Services v. Board of Adjustment, 20 N.J. 275, 119 A.2d
761 (1956); Town of Broomfield v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 18 N.J. 237, 113 A.2d 658 (1955);
State ex ref. Ohio Turnpike Comm. v. Allen, 158 Ohio St. 168, 170 N.E.2d 345 (1952), cert. denied,
Balduff v. Ohio Turnpike Comm., 344 U.S. 865; Duquesne Light Co. v. Upper St. Clair Township,
337 Pa. 323, 105 A.2d 287 (1954).
88 Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 970 (1958).
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diction exemption from the generally applicable regulations established by the broader jurisdiction?
IV.

STANDARDS

FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

In addition to defining the standards for legislative action,
recent Colorado zoning cases have also developed some guides for
judicial review. The guides are as follows:
1. A zoning ordinance is presumed valid, and more than a
preponderance of the evidence is required to overcome this
presumption.
2. The judiciary may not perform a legislative function.
3. A general legislative declaration of the basis of zoning
amendments is to be interpreted as a legislative finding on
specific amendment requests.
In many respects, these guides have the general effect of extending
to the field of zoning the same concepts which are applicable in
other fields of municipal law.
A. Presumption of Validity; Degree of Proof
While the Colorado Supreme Court had ruled on a number of
occasions on the general question of presumptions attending review of the constitutionality of various municipal ordinances, it
did not speak with respect to zoning until 1961.
In the Baum case,8 9 Mr. Justice Day, speaking for the court,
commented that "heretofore this court has not stated or pronounced
any definite or exact standards for determining the validity of a
zoning ordinance." 90 The opinion reviewed a number of earlier
Colorado cases dealing with the presumption of validity of municipal ordinances on other subjects, and continued: "A zoning ordinance, like other legislative enactments, is presumed to be valid,
and one assailing it bears the burden of overcoming that presumption. and courts indulge every intendment in favor of its validity." 91
The Baum case described the degree of proof required to overcome the presumption to be "clear and convincing. '92 In the Frankel
case, Mr. Justice Day described the degree of proof as "establishing
the invalidity thereof beyond a reasonable doubt. '93 Generally,
these standards are well accepted. Rhyne, in his notable text on
municipal law, points out: "Municipal ordinances are entitled to a
presumption of validity, and will be sustained unless clearly invalid. In addition, one challenging the validity of an ordinance not
only has the burden of proof, but also must show that he is subject
to and aggrieved by its provisions." 94 The numerous cases he cites
in support of his comment are indicative of the prevalence of this
principle.
B. ProhibitionAgainst Judicial Legislation
Several recent cases dealt with the problem of judicial invasion
of the legislative sphere. In essence, in cases of this type, the trial
court declares the zoning void (which is within the realm of proper
judicial review), and then goes on to grant a specific use or a
89 Baum v. Denver, 363 P.2d 688 (Colo. 1961).
90 Id. at 692.
91 Id. at 691.
92 Id. at 694.
93 Frankel v. Denver, 363 P.2d 1063, 1065 (Colo. 1961).
94 Rhyne, Municipal Law 238 (1957). Footnote superscripts omitted from the quotation.
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particular zone which should be applied to plaintiff's property. This
combination is what is termed "judicial legislation."
In the case of Nelson v. Farr,5 the city of Greeley zoned land
for business purposes. The trial court "in effect, re-zoned the property as residential A and prohibited the city from altering such
zoning or enforcing any zoning in conflict with the court's determination that the property be devoted exclusively to single family
dwellings."96 . This action by the trial court was held to be judicial
legislation, and was consequently reversed by the supreme court.
In the Baum case, 97 the supreme court affirmed the trial court's
denial of a petition to permit construction of a shopping center
across the street from a business zone. The supreme court commented: "The selection of a boundary line between use districts is
a legislative function, peculiarly within the power of the municipal
legislative body. 98 The same point was reiterated in the Frankel
case, 99 where the court affirmed the trial court's refusal to permit
the applicant to build an apartment in a single-family residence
zone on a site about 100 feet from the boundary of an apartment
zone. (See map 3 supra.)
The Shaffer case100 was a somewhat extreme case of judicial
legislation wherein the trial court's decision resulted in four different zonings of one intersection. (See map 2 supra.) In reversing
the trial court, the supreme court again pointed out the prohibition
against judicial invasion of the legislative sphere of responsibility.
Applying the same principle, the Denver Buick case 01 vacated
a district court order directing that B-5 (central business district)
zoning be applied to a certain large area of land in Denver.
Earlier cases did not recognize this problem of separation of
powers. Once the supreme court decided that, under common law
and code pleadings, a writ of mandamus for the issuance of a building permit was a proper remedy in a zoning case, 10 2 the inevitable
result was that the court was not merely determining that the
existing regulation was void, but also was determining what was
the proper regulation. This was not illogical in the light of the fact
95 143 Colo. 423, 354 P.2d 163 (1960).
96 Id. at 429, 354 P.2d at 166.
97 Baum v. Denver, 363 P.2d 688 (Colo. 1961).
98 Id. at 696.
99 Frankel v. Denver, 363 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Colo. 1961).
100 Board of County Comm'rs v. Shaffer, 367 P.2d 751, 755 (Colo. 1961).
101 City & County of Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc., 141 Colo. 121, 139, 347 P.2d 919, 930 (1960).
102 Hedgcock v. People ex rel. Reed, 91 Colo. 155, 158, 13 P.2d 264, 265 (1932), contains a review
of mandamus as a remedy in a zoning controversy.
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that early zoning ordinances permitted a quasi-judicial body, the
board of adjustment, to vary the use requirements of the zoning
ordinance, and upon appeal, the court could overrule the decision
of the board. Probably the most extreme of these early cases were
the second Hedgcock case, 03 where the court authorized the extension of a non-conforming business area across an alley (see map 7),
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and the Webber case,10 4 where the court extended a conforming
business development to adjacent property located on the end of
the existing zone. (See map 5 supra.)
With the development of the concept that land use is of the
essence in zoning ordinances (discussed in the introduction of this
103 Hedgcock v. People ex rel. Arden Realty Co., 98 Colo. 522, 57 P.2d 891 (1936).
104 People ex rel. Friedman v. Webber, 110 Colo. 161, 132 P.2d 187 (1942).
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article), the recent trends of legislative elimination of administrative authorization to make land use changes and the judicial recognition of the legislative character of this determination are parallel
and consistent. This general prohibition of invasion of the legislative
sphere by the judiciary is consistent with the general principles of
constitutional and municipal law in this country. 10 5
C. Effect of Legislative Declaration of Basis for Amendments
Most city councils in Colorado do not prepare statements of the
factors considered when passing an ordinance. This leaves the courts
free to explore the realm of possible reasons underlying the action
of the city council, when deciding the reasonableness of the ordinance. The desirability of the council incorporating into the ordinance a statement of its reasoning is a matter of considerable difference of opinion among attorneys. The 1956 Denver zoning ordinance contains the following legislative declaration:
For the purpose of establishing and maintaining sound,
stable and desirable development within the territorial
limits of the municipality, this ordinance, and as here used
the term ordinance shall be deemed to include the official
map, shall not be amended except to correct a manifest
error in the ordinance or, because of changed or changing
conditions in a particular area or in the municipality generally, to re-zone an area or extend the boundary thereof,
only as reasonably necessary to the
10 6 promotion of the public
health, safety or general welfare.
The court was interpreting the ordinance containing this clause
in the Frankel case. 10 7 In this particular instance, the council had
refused to grant a re-zoning of three parcels of land from Single
family residence (R-1) to apartment zoning (R-3). The court held
that the council was bound by this declaration of policy, and hence,
it was applicable to specific council actions, observing:
By rejecting the bill for an ordinance to re-zone a small
part of the subject R-1 district, Council necessarily determined that there was no manifest error in the classification
of plaintiffs' lots. Council also determined that the asserted
changed or changing conditions in the particular area or in
the municipality generally did not require re-zoning of a
small section or part of the R-1 district. In effect Council
also determined that the requested re-zoning was not reasonably necessary for the promotion of public health, safety
or general welfare. 08
V. PROCEDURAL MATTERS
A number of procedural issues were raised in the recent zoning
cases. The first dealt with who was eligible to sue. As a general rule,
the only one who can sue is an adversely affected party. 10 9 In the
1058 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.278 (3d ed. rev. 1957, and Supp. 1961); 1 Metzenbourn, Zoning 101 (2e ed. rev. 1957); 1 Rothkopf, Zoning and Planning ch. 36 (3d ed. 1960); 1
Yokely, Zoning Law or.d Practice §185 (2d ed. 1953, and Supp. 1961); 101 C.J.S. Zoning § 323 (1958).
106 Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code § 618.1 (1956).
107 Frankel v. Denver, 363 P.2d 1063 (Colo. 1961).
108 Id. at 1067.
109 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.292 (3d ed. rev. 1957, and Supp. 1961); 2 Metzenbourn, Zoning 1020 (2d ed. 1955, and Supp. 1961); 2 Rathkopf, Zoning and Planning ch. 69 (3d ed.
1960); Rhyne, Municipal Corporations §§ 32-37 (1957); Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 1143 (1954); 58 Am. Jur.
Zoning J 253 (1948); 101 C.J.S. Zoning §§ 20, 321 (1958).
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case of Westwood Meat Market, Inc. v. McLucas,110 plaintiffs were
business owners located at some distance from the subject property,
who were suing to have a business zone declared void. The court
held none of the plaintiffs were aggrieved persons, and added:
"Zoning may not be used as a means of stifling proposed competition.""1 " The court cited six Colorado cases in
112 support of this position, most of the cases dealing with zoning.
A second procedural issue was whether the plaintiff can sue
without having first exhausted his administrative remedies. In the
Baum case, 113 plaintiffs had neither made application for a building
permit, nor sought relief from the board of adjustment. The court
summarized the rule as follows:
The plaintiffs' contention is that the zoning ordinance
results in a confiscatory reduction of the plaintiffs' property, prohibits the use thereof for business and commercial
purposes, and prevents "any use, service or income to be derived from the property." This attack is directed to the
entire ordinance as it affects their property and not to any
specific provision or provisions thereof. They contend that
the ordinance, in effect, constitutes a present and continuing invasion of their property rights. Under the allegations
of the complaint,
jurisdiction of the court is clearly esta114
blished.
This rule is also generally in accord with the prevailing rule.115
The third procedural point was one upon which the courts are
divided. In the Holly Development case," 6 plaintiff used certiorari
to test the action of the board of county commissioners in re-zoning
certain land. Usually, certiorari is a writ for testing the jurisdiction
or the abuse of discretion of an administrator, a court, or quasijudicial body. 117 This was the application in all the cases cited as
precedent for the court's action. However, in the instant case, the
action of the board of county commissioners was construed to be
legislative in character. In commenting on the use of the writ, the
court quoted Corpus Juris Secundum as indicative of the general
rule: " [W] henever there is no direct remedy provided for review,
the writ of certiorari lies, even though some other remedy can be
conceived as possible in the future."" 18
The Holly Development case also dealt with the general problem of notice. Here, the notice of the required zoning hearing failed
to indicate that zoning was involved in the hearing, stating merely
"Charlou Park, Third Filing. A-2 to R.," and stating the date, time
110 361 P.2d 776 (Colo. 1961).
111 Id. at 778.
112 City & County of Denver v. Redding Miller, 141 Colo. 269, 347 P.2d 954 (1960); City &
County of Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc., 141 Colo. 121, 347 P.2d 919 (1960); Erickson v. Groomer,
139 Colo. 32, 336 P.2d 296 (1959); City & County of Denver v. Denver Buick, 136 Colo. 482, 319
P.2d 490 (1958); Board of Adjustment v. Iwerks, 136 Colo. 578, 316 P.2d 576 (1957); Cliff v. Bilett,
125 Colo. 138, 241 P.2d 437 (1952).
113 Baum v. Denver, 363 P.2d 688 (Colo. 1961).
114 Id. at 691.
115 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.283 (3d ed. rev. 1957, and Supp. 1961); 1 Metzen.
bourn, Zoning 708 (2d ed. 1955, and Supp. 1961); 1 Rathkopf, Planning and Zoning ch. 35 (3d ed.
1960); 2 Rathkopf, Planning and Zoning ch. 65 (3d ed. 1960, and Supp. 1961); 58 Am. Jur. Zoning
§5 243-45 (1948); 101 C.J.S. Zoning 5 321 (1958).
116 Holly Dev., Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 140 Colo. 95, 342 P.2d 1032 (1959).
117 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.286 (3d ed. rev. 1957, and Supp. 1961); 1 Rathkopf,
Zoning and Planning chs. 64-65 (3d ed. 1960); 58 Am. Jur. Zoning § 233 (1948); 101 C.J.S. Zoning
335 (1958).
118 Supra note 116, at 99, 342 P.2d at 1035.
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and place of the hearing. The court held that this notice was void
on two grounds: (1) It did not inform the public of anything. (2)
The original zoning was not as set forth in the notice. The court
further held that the deficiency was jurisdictional in nature, and
the subsequent appearance of the plaintiffs at the hearing did not
confer jurisdiction. 11 9
In the same case, the court construed Colo. Rev. Stat. § 106-2-11
(1953), which requires that zoning maps be attached to a proposed
zoning resolution. In this case, the resolution recited that the maps
were attached, but in fact they were not. The court pointed out
that the omission was not an oversight, but that the illness of a
draftsman had resulted in the maps not being prepared. This, the
court held, was a fatal omission. 20 The court also observed as dictum: "It is the duty of the zoning officials to have proper information available in a public office so that those affected can determine their rights and privileges,
as well as the duties and restric12 1
tions applicable to them.'

122
In the case of Trailer Towns, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment,
the court interpreted an introduction to a printed version of a Jefferson County zoning ordinance, which read: "In order to meet the
convenience of the property owners, realtors, and other interested
citizens of Jefferson County, the County Planning Commission and
Board of County Commissioners have printed this resolution for
public distribution. * * *",123 Plaintiff had used this resolution, reading it literally, and acting accordingly. The court in essence held
that under the circumstances, he was entitled to do so, and that
all parties to the proceedings
were obliged to abide by the exact
2 4
text of the resolution.
The last procedural issue to be considered involved the 1956
Denver zoning ordinance requiring reports on requested zoning
amendments to be made to the city council by the planning office,
the department of zoning administration, and others. 2' In the
Frankel case,'2 6 the planning board report had noted that the landowners in the area for which re-zoning was requested were opposed
to the request. The city council had denied the request, but had
not stated its specific reasons. Plaintiff alleged illegal delegation
of power. The court noted that the council was not bound by the
department reports, and added: "We know of no case-and none is
cited-invalidating legislation because machinery is provided therein to afford affected parties opportunity to protest departure from
the terms of an act or ordinance. "1'7

VI. OTHER PROBLEMS
A variety of special problems arose in the recent cases.
In the Trailer Towns case.'12 8 the court was construing the term
'any residential district." Specifically, the R-C (Residential Com119 Id. at 100, 342 P.2d at 1035.
120 Id. at 103, 342 P.2d at 1036.
121 Id. at 106, 342 P.2d at 1038.
122 144 Colo. 340, 356 F.2d 251 (1960).
123 Id. at 343, 356 P.2o at 253.
124 Ibid.
125 Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code §§ 618.4, 618.5 (1956).
126 Frankel v. Denver, 363 P.2d 1063 (Colo. 1961).
127 Id. at 1066.
128 Trailer Towns, Inc., v. Board of Adjustment, 144 Colo. 340, 356 P.2d 251 (1960).
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mercial) zone in Jefferson County had as a use by right "any use
permitted in any residential district." Later, the county created a
district known as a R-T (Residential Trailer) zone. Plaintiff wanted
to erect a trailer camp on land zoned R-C. The court held that the
zoning resolution had to be construed as written, and that the uses
in the R-T zone were permitted in the R-C zone. The court commented: "It may be that such was not intended by the planning
commission, but the plaintiff was and is justified in being guided
by the wording of the resolution rather than by a secret or unexpressed intent of the commission. ' ' 129 A similar conclusion was

reached by the Colorado Supreme Court in the earlier cases of
Jones v. Board of Adjustment,13 People ex rel. Gremmon v. Hedgcock, 131 and Di Salle v. Giggal,132 where, in essence, the court said
that zoning ordinances had to be interpreted as written. As a general proposition, this is self evident, and13 is a common position for
the courts to take in cases of this type.
In the case of City of Englewood v. Apostolic Christian
Church,"4 the Englewood zoning ordinance permitted churches in
the R-1 and R-2 districts only with the approval of the board of
adjustment. The majority decision deemed this provision to be a
prohibition, and voided the requirement on the grounds that it had
135
no relationship to the public health, safety, morals or welfare.
The concurring opinion, written by Mr. Justice McWilliams, deemed
the provision to grant a permissive right to build, rather than an
absolute right, but held that the board of adjustment had acted
arbitrarily in refusing its approval.136 The courts in the country
are divided on the issue raised by this case. 137 Presumably, the
question of freedom of religion under the First Amendment to the
129 Id. at 342, 356 P.2d at 253.
130 119 Colo. 420, 204 P.2d 560 (1949).
131 106 Colo. 300, 104 P.2d 607 (1940).
132 128 Colo. 208, 261 P.2d 499 (1953).
133 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.71 (3d ed. rev. 1957, and Supp. 1961); 1 Rothkopf,
Zoninq and Plonninq $ 8-1 (3d ed. 1960); Rhyne, Municipal Law 243 (1957); 57 Am. Jur. Zoning
11 (1948); 101 C.J.S. Zoning § 130 (1958).
134 363 P.2d 172 (Colo. 1961).
135 Id. at 175.
136 Id. at 177.
137 8 McQuillin, Municipol Corporations § 25.128, notes 9, 10 (3d ed. rev. 1957, and Supp. 1961);
2 Metzenbaum, Zoning 1461 (2d ed. 1955, and Supp. 1961); 1 Rathkopf, Zoning and Planning ch. 19
(3d e-1.1960); Rhyne, M.'.,r' ol Law § 3".4R (1957); 2 Yokelv. Zoning Low and Practice § 222 (2d
ed. 1953, and Supp. 1961); 58 Am. Jur. Zoning § 44 (1948); 101 C.J.S.Zoning § 172 (1958).
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United States Constitution was not raised in this
case, although it
13
has been an argument in some cases in this field. 8
In the case of Wellman v. Haug,139 the court was interpreting
the term: "Lot area." The court ruled that this was not necessarily
synonymous with a platted lot. It defined the term for zoning purposes as follows: "Under zoning practice and in the present case
it means any contiguous quantity of land in the possession of, owned
by, or recorded as the property of the same claimant, person or
company.' 40 The case cited a number of41 cases from other jurisdictions in accord, but none from Colorado.
Finally, in the Frankel case, 142 the court dealt with the problem
of the special treatment of non-conforming uses. Plaintiff claimed
that the zoning ordinance was discriminatory because owners of
non-conforming uses were treated differently than other owners
of land in the same zone. This argument was raised many times in
the early zoning cases, and the United States Supreme Court discussed the matter at length in the Euclid case. 14 The argument was
rejected by the Colorado court, based on the Euclid case, and also
a number of early cases from other jurisdictions. 144 In essence, the
Denver Buick case, 145 decided in 1960, held that the existing rights
of owners of non-conforming properties had to be protected. The
Frankel case took the next logical step required to preserve the
general constitutionality of zoning as an exercise of the police
power.
CONCLUSION

Zoning in the modern urban community is a tool with great
potentialities for good or evil. It involves a constant process of
striking a balance of the public interest in stabilization of development on the one hand and in accommodation to changing conditions
on the other. The recent cases decided by the Colorado Supreme
Court have established rules for the guidance of both legislative
action and judicial review, and these rules pertain to both substantive and procedural aspects of the zoning process. Under these
recent decisions, the regulating jurisdiction and the landowner
being regulated also have their respective rights and duties more
clearly defined. Adherence to these rules, combined with competent technical work on the zoning regulations themselves, should
result in a more responsible exercise of public authority to safeguard the public interest without, at the same time, unnecessarily
limiting individual freedom.
138 1 Rathkopf, Zoning and Planning § 19-1 (3d ed. 1960).
139 360 P.2d 972 (Colo. 1961).
140 Id. at 974.
141 See also 25A Words and Phrases 419, "Lot" (1961).
142 Frankel v. Denver, 363 P.2d 1063 (Colo. 1961).
143 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Ca., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
144 Magruder v. Redwood City, 203 Cal. 665, 265 Pac. 806 (1928); Miller v. Board of Public Works,
195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac. 381 (1925); Marquis v. City of Waterloo, 210 Iowa 439, 228 N.W. 870 (1930);
Sampere v. City of New Orleans, 166 La. 776, 117 So. 827 (1928); aff'd 279 U.S. 812; Brett v.
Building Comm'rs, 250 Mass. 73, 145 N.E. 269 (1924); Ballard v. Roth, 141 Misc. 319, 253 N.Y.S. 6
(1931); Baxley v. City of Frederick, 133 Okla. 84, 271 Pac. 257 (1928); Lombardo v. City of Dallas,
47 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), off'd 124 Tex. 1, 73 S.W.2d 475 (1934); State ex rel.Carter v.
Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N.W. 451 (1923).
145 City & County of Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc., 141 Colo. 121, 347 P.2d 919 (1960).
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COPYRIGHTS: ABANDONMENT BY PUBLICATION
By AULT M.

NATHANIELSZ*

This paper was awarded the First Prize of $250 in the 1962
Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition at the University of Denver
College of Law and has been submitted to the national copyright
writing competition. It is published through the courtesy of the
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.
The doctrine that an author has a right of property in
his ideas and is entitled to demand for them the same perpetual protection which the law accords to the proprietor
of personal property generally, finds no recognition either
in the common law or in the statutes of any civilized country. When he has embodied his thoughts in manuscript, the
latter is his exclusive property having the characteristics of
transfer and succession common to personal property. Being
his property, the author may exercise full dominion over it.
He may publish it to the world or not, at his option.1
There are no property rights in an idea.2 It is the physical
manifestation of ideas which is property, not the ideas themselves.
There are, as a matter of fact, two separate and distinct types of
property rights in such property.3 The manuscript is tangible property which is capable of being owned and sold just as any personalty
and as the paper itself before any written word was placed on it.
The second right is an intangible right, separate and apart from
the paper, the manifestation of thought. This second right is the
exclusive right to reproduce or copy the manifestation.
The Supreme Court explained the distinction between the intangible right to copy and the rights of ownership of the tangible
object produced in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus.4 The Court held that
the copyright is an exclusive right to multiply copies for the benefit
of the creator or his assigns disconnected from, although dependent
on, physical existence. It is an incorporeal right to print and publish.
It is not a right to perpetually own the copies made with authority
of the author or his assignee. Once this tangible property is sold the
originator has no control over the item, although he remains the
sole owner of the intangible right to copy.5
These two distinct rights are originally in one person, the author, but the rights later may and usually do exist in different persons at the same time, i.e., the author and the owner of a copy.
Indeed if this were not true then the person who owned a writing,
either the original manuscript or a copy, by virtue of having title
* June graduate, University of Denver College of Law.
1 Carter v. Bailey, 64 Me. 458, 461, 18 Am. Rep. 273, 274 (1874).
2 Dunham v. General Mills, 116 F.Supp. 152 (D. Mass. 1953); Carter v. Bailey, supra note 1;
Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N.Y. 532, 7 Am.Rep. 480 (1872).
3 Bobbs.Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908); Stephens v. Cody, 14 How. (55 U.S.) 528
(1852); Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321 (2d Cir. 1904).
4 Supro note 3.
5 Id. at 347. The Court quoted Stephens v. Cady, 14 How. (55 U.S.) 528, 530 (1852); "The
copyright is an exclusive right to the multiplication of the copies, for the benefit of the author or
his assigns, disconnected from the plate, or any other physical existence. It is an incorporeal right
to print and publish...... The sole right to vend is not to be construed as to give the author
after he has sold a copy the right to control the price of resale. The author has lost his property
right in the physical item sold. It is the right to make copies which is protected. The book itself
is the property of the buyer.
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to the tangible personalty could copy it. The raison d'etre of copyright law is to allow the author to dispose of the tangible property
but to retain the intangible right to copy exclusively and thus encourage the arts by allowing the author to profit by selling copies
of his work.
It is the intangible right to prevent others from copying with
which the law of copyrights, either common law or statutory, concerns itself, and it is this right that will be involved whenever the
terms literary property rights or intellectual property rights are
used. Once the thought is made manifest, the particular manifestation is, under common law doctrine, the sole and complete property
of the artist.6 This is what is sometimes called a common law copyright; it is akin to and based upon personal property rights. In
Wheaton v. Peters,7 the Supreme Court said: "That an author, at
common law, has a property in his manuscript, and may obtain
redress against anyone who deprives him of it, or by improperly
obtaining a copy endeavors to realize a profit by its publication,
cannot be doubted." s This was restated with approval by the Supreme Court in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus.9
Indeed the right of an author to control the reproduction and
publication of any work, at least until such time as he first publishes
it or authorizes its publication, has never been seriously doubted.
This common law protection of the right to copy comes into existence when a manifestation of an idea is created and remains perpetually in existence until publication is made. 10 This common law
right is now recognized by statute." The question has more forcefully arisen as to an author's rights in literary property after publication.
Most authors write for the express purpose of having their
work published, although it is true there have been some authors
who did not have this goal in mind but penned their work for
amusement, or for close friends. If an author's right to control or
6 Little v. Hall, 18 How. (59 U.S.) 165 (1856); Grant v. Kellogg, 154 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1946);
58 F.Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
7 8 Pet. (33 U.S.) 591 (1834).
8 Id. at 657.
9 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908).
10 Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321 (2d Cir. 1904). The decision in
this case was cited with approval and made the basis for the decision of the Supreme Court in
American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907).
11 17 U.S.C. §2 (1947) which reads: "Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or limit
the right of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to
prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work without his consent, and to
obtain damages therefor."

Expert
Brief Printers

ToHE
AM 6-3277

• Commercial Printing
e Catalogues and Brochures
* Year Books- Magazines
Books - Book Binding
T House Organs

Be2
l PRESS
PRESS

STREET

2400 CURTIS
Deaver, Colorado

DICTA

JULY-AUGUST, 1962

prevent copying terminates upon first publication the author has
lost a valuable asset, i.e., his literary property rights. The framers
of the Constitution realized this. Thus, the Constitution expressly
provides that the Congress shall be empowered: "To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors 2 the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.'
Congress exercised this power in 1790 by enacting a copyright
law.3 The Supreme Court first interpreted this statute in 1834 in
the case of Wheaton v. Peters14 and discussed the author's literary
property rights at length. The Court held that the copyright clause
of the Constitution did not merely permit Congress to enact laws
which would be declaratory of existing rights, but permitted Congress to enact laws which would create new legal rights, pursuant
to the object of the copyright clause. Copyright after publication
originates under the act of Congress, and therefore, each requirement of the statute must be complied with to perfect the copyright.
The Wheaton v. Peters" case is somewhat confusing since it
held that the right to copyright protection after publication is purely
statutory, springing directly from the Constitution. The reason for
this holding, the Court seemed to say, is that there is no federal
common law. (This reasoning was not adopted as a rule of law until
the famous case of Erie v. Tompkins 6 in 1938.) Yet the Court also
said by way of dictum in the Wheaton case that prepublication
rights of authors exists at common law and that these rights would
be recognized. The inconsistencies in dictum and the reasoning of
the Court in this case were pointed to in a later Supreme Court
decision, Holmes v. Hurst.7 In this case the Court traced the development of copyright law:
The right of an author, irrespective of statute, to his
own productions and to a control of their publication,
seems to have been recognized by the common law, but to
have been so ill-defined that from an early period legislation was adopted to regulate and limit such right. The earliest recognition of this common law right is to be found in
the charter of the Stationers' Company, and certain decrees
of the Star Chamber promulgated in 1556, 1585, 1623, and
1637, providing for licensing -and regulating the manner of
printing, and the number of presses throughout the Kingdom, and prohibiting the publication of unlicensed books.
Indeed, the Star Chamber seems to have exercised the power of search, confiscation, and imprisonment without interruption from Parliament, up to its abolition in 1641. From
this time the law seems to have been in an unsettled statealthough Parliament made some efforts to restrain the licentiousness of the press-until the eighth year of Queen
Anne, when the first copyright act was passed, giving authors a monopoly in the publication of their works for a
period of from fourteen to twenty-eight years. Notwith12
13
14
15
16
17

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
Howell, The Copyright Law 4-6 (3d ed. 1952).
Supro note 7.
Ibid.
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
174 U.S. 82 (1899).
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standing this act, however, the chancery court continued to
hold that, by the common law and independently of legislation, there was a property of unlimited duration in printed
books. This principle was affirmed as late as 1769 by the
court of King's bench in the very carefully considered case
of Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, in which the right of the
author of "Thomson's Seasons" to a monopoly of this work
was asserted and sustained. But a few years thereafter the
House of Lords, upon an equal division of the judges, declared that the common law right had been taken away
by the statute of Anne, and that authors were limited in
their monopoly by that act. Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burr.
2408. This remains the law of England to the present day.
An act similar in its provisions to the statute of Anne was
enacted by Congress in 1790, and the construction put upon
the latter in Donaldsonv. Becket was followed by this court
in Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591. While the propriety of
these decisions has been the subject of a good deal of controversy among legal writers, it seems now to be considered
the settled law of this country and England that the right
of an author to a monopoly of his publications is measured
and determined by the copyright act-in other words, that
while a right did exist by common law, it has been superseded by statute."i
It is equally well settled that neither the Constitution nor the statute affects the author's common law rights prior to publication, but
the Supreme Court in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus19 quoted with
approval Drone on Copyright, page 100: "[W] hen a work is published in print, the owner's common-law rights are lost; and, unless
the publication be in accordance with the
' 20 requirements of the statute, the statutory right is not secured.
It is evident that the concept of "publication" is a critical one
in copyright law, because at the time of publication common law
rights cease and a dedication to the public is made unless the statutory requirements are met and statutory rights arise, in which
case common law rights are relinquished at the time statutory
rights are claimed. It has been said:
The word "publication" has no definite and fixed meaning. "The word is legally very old, and of no one certain
meaning.*** The thought, however, running through all the
uses of the word is an advising of the public, a making
known of something to them for a purpose." Associated
Press v. International News Service, 2 Cir., 245 F. 244, 250,
2 A.L.R. 317.21
And this is true even though the present statute defines "date of
publication":
In the interpretation and construction of this title "the
date of publication" shall in the case of a work of which
copies are reproduced for sale or distribution be held to be
18 Id. at 84-85.
19 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
20 Id. at 347.
21 Marx v. United States, 96 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1938). The court went on to say that the
29 years of copyright protection in cases of copyrighted material not intended for reproduction for
sale starts running at the date of deposit. This holding is now codified as 17 U.S.C. § 12 (1947).
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the earliest date when copies of the first authorized edition
were placed on sale, sold, or publicly distributed by the proprietor of the copyright or under his authority .... 22
It must be noted that although the statute defines "date of publication" it does not define date of publication of those copyrighted
items not to be reproduced for sale. Judge Augustus Hand stated
in interpreting this section (which was then section 62 of the Copyright Law) in CardinalFilm Corp. v. Beck 23 that it "was an enactment to fix the date from which the copyright term should begin
to run,
and not a general definition of what constituted publica24
tion.

It is plain that what constitutes an act of publication is not
clearly legislatively defined, but the legislature has merely made a
declaration as to when the statutory period of protection begins in
respect to those copyrighted works intended to be reproduced for
sale. In all other cases the word "publication" is defined by judicial
interpretation.
The publication of a literary work without compliance with
the statutory requirements necessary to acquire a copyright is a
dedication to the public of the particular work and this results in
the loss of all exclusive rights to copy. The work enters the public
domain and may be freely copied or reproduced. This is true since
statutory copyright protection does not grant the author any rights
to reproduce but is a limitation on the rights of others to coliy. The
22 17 U.S.C. 1 26 (1947). (Emphasis
23 248 Fed. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
24 Ibid.
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has the legal right by statute to restrain others from copyauthor
25
ing.
The procedure by which one obtains a copyright is not complicated, but many authors fail to take the required steps to protect
their literary productions until2 6it is too late and the literary property is deemed to be abandoned.

The general rule seems to be that a publication sufficient to
terminate common law rights is a general publication and not a
restricted dissemination of the work. The 7Supreme Court has held
in American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister that "to constitute publication there must be such a dissemination of the work of art itself
with
among the public, as to justify the belief that it took place
'2
In this
the intention of rendering such work common property.
case it was held that there was no such general publication of a
painting when it was exhibited, without notice of copyright in an
art gallery where the public was admitted for a fee and members
free and where by the laws of the gallery no one was allowed to
copy or take notes of paintings exhibited. Since there was no general publication the artist's common law literary property protection was not abandoned.
It is important to note in the above definition that the intent
of the author to abandon is immaterial. This concept was reiterated
by the Supreme Court in Holmes v. Hurst 29 when the Court held
that if an author allows his intellectual production to be published
without complying with the statute, his right exclusively to copy
is lost irrespective of his intent not to abandon.
The interesting and often cited case of F. W. Dodge Co. v. Construction Information Co. 30 gives an insight into where the courts
may draw the line between a general publication which will terminate the common law rights to copyright and a private disclosure
which will keep these rights intact. The F. W. Dodge Company was
engaged in the business of compiling and distributing to customers
information concerning contemplated construction projects. The information was distributed to customers under contracts in which
the customers agreed to keep the information confidential. The
defendants procured this information, copied it and sold copies to
their customers. The Court decided that the plaintiffs had a property right in the compilations of data which, whether subject to
copyright or not, would be protected and that the dissemination of
information in this manner was not a general publication which
would end the common law copyrights.
Earlier the case of Jewelers' Mercantile Agency v. Jewelers'
Weekly Pub. Co.3 1 presented a similar factual situation. In this case
the compiler of information rented books containing business information to any who wished to rent. The leasing contract provided
that the information was to be confidential. The court said that this
amounted to a general publication. The mere fact that the book
was leased rather than sold outright to those nMembers of the public
25 State v. State Journal Co., 75 Neb. 275, 106 N.W. 434 (1905).
26 The learned author, Dr. Oliver Wendel Holmes, made this mistake when he first published his
now famous work, "An Autocrat at the Breakfast Table." Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899).
27 207 U.S. 284 (1907).
28 Id. at 299.
29 174 U.S. 82 (1899).
30 183 Mass. 62, 66 N.E. 204 (1903).
31 155 N.Y. 241, 49 N.E. 872 (1898).
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who wished to lease such work did not change the character of the
publication from a general one to a limited dissemination.
[0] ur examination leads us to the conclusion that the present state of the law is that, if a book be put within reach of
the general public, so that all may have access to it, no matter what limitations be put upon the use of it by the individual subscriber or lessee, it is published, and what is known
as the common-law
copyright, or right of first publication,
32
is gone.

This case is weakened as precedent by the fact that the plaintiff
had deposited two copies at the Library of Congress. The court in
the majority opinion takes pain to point out that this alone would
be a publication, while three judges concurred, specially limiting
the grounds for reversal to the fact that the depositing of two copies
of the publication in the Library of Congress was publication.
It can be seen that there is an important distinction to be drawn
between a general publication and a limited distribution. If a general publication has been made, common law rights to copy are lost;
if such a publication has not been made, the common law rights
are not lost. Whether the court will determine that such a publication has been made in a particular case is difficult to predict with
certainty since each case will turn on its own facts.
Into the apparently well settled law came the troublesome case
of International News Service v. Associated Press.3 3 The plaintiff
was a news wire service; the defendant was a competitor in the
same business. The defendant pirated the plaintiff's stories and
issued them as its own to its own customers. The pirated news
stories were obtained from four sources: (1) employees of plaintiff
who were bribed, (2) members of the plaintiff's news wire association who were induced to divulge the stories, (3) the defendant
who copied news stories from bulletin boards where they were
posted, and (4) the defendant who copied stories from early morning
editions on the east coast and telegraphed these stories to the west
coast for publication there. Neither the newspapers from which the
stories were pirated nor the stories themselves were copyrighted.
The plaintiff realizing he could assert no statutory copyright,
brought an equitable action to restrain the defendant's acts on the
basis of unfair competition.
The circuit court of appeals said that there were valuable property rights in the news gathered but no literary property rights
as such. The east coast newspapers which were members of the
Associated Press system printed their stories with its permission.
The court held, however, that these member newspapers had no
right to abandon by publication the Associated Press' property
right in the news. Quoting from Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., the court said: "The nature of the property in question
[a painting] in large measure determines the extent of public
right."'34 The court went on to say: "And it was held that unless
there was an 'abandonment of copyright or dedication to the public,'
the owner of a thing capable of copyright could 'expressly or by
implication confine the enjoyment of such subject to some occasion
32 Id. at 876.
33 248 U.S. 215 (1918), affirming 245 Fed. 244 (2d Cir. 1917).
34 245 Fed. 244, 251 (2d Cir. 1917).
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or definite purpose.'-35 This is undoubtedly correct, but the intent
of the author, as has been pointed out, is immaterial. The question
is whether there has been a general publication so that the public
would be justified in believing there has been such a dedication.
The court went on to hold that the piracy by the defendant was a
tort in the nature of unfair competition and injunction was ordered.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court,36 after a short discussion of
literary property and the effect of the copyright statute, decided
the case solely on the grounds of unfair competition, stating:
[W]hen the rights or privileges of the one are liable to
conflict with those of the other each party is under a duty
35 Ibid.
36 248 U.S. 215 ki918).
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so to conduct its own business as not unnecessarily or unfairly to injure that of the other. [Citations omitted.]
Obviously, the question of what is unfair competition
in business must be determined with particular reference
to the character and circumstances of the business. The
question here is not so much the rights of either party as
against the public, but their rights as between themselves.
See Morison v. Moat, 9 Hare, 241, 258, 68 Eng. Reprint, 492.
And although we may and do assume that neither party
has any remaining property interest as against the public
in uncopyrighted news matter after the moment of its first
publication, it by no means follows that there is no remaining property interest in it as between themselves. For, to
both of them alike, news matter, however little susceptible
of ownership or dominion in the absolute sense, is stock in
trade, to be gathered at the cost of enterprise, organization,
skill, labor, and money, and to be distributed and sold to
those who will pay money for it, as for any other merchandise. Regarding the news, therefore, as but the material out
of which both parties are seeking to make profits at the
same time and in the same field, we hardly can fail to recognize that for this purpose, and as between them, it must
be regarded as quasi property, irrespective of the rights of
either as against the public.
In order to sustain the jurisdiction of equity over the
controversy, we need not affirm any general and absolute
property in the news as such. The rule that a court of
equity concerns itself only in the protection of property
rights treats any civil right of a pecuniary nature as a property right [Citations omitted.]; and the right to acquire
property by honest labor or the conduct of a lawful business is as much entitled to protection as the right to guard
property already acquired. [Citations omitted.] It is this
right that furnishes the basis of 37the jurisdiction in the
ordinary case of unfair competition.
Using this reasoning as the basis for its opinion, the Supreme
Court affirmed the circuit court of appeals holding to enjoin the
piracy and to afford reasonable protection of the complainant's
newspapers from such piracy.
Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissent recognized the "injustice"
that would be involved in allowing the piracy, but stated that the
Court was "making new law." He succinctly points out that the
publication by the east coast papers is a general publication and
thus destroys common law copyrights in spite of the intent of the
plaintiff. It is difficult to comprehend the distinction between the
type of piracy involved in this case and that involved in a case
where an author neglects or omits to copyright his book prior to a
general publication and another prints that book thus depriving
the author of his rewards. The piracy here was enjoined as unfair
competition, but Hurst was not prevented from pirating Dr. Holmes'
book "Autocrat at the Breakfast Table" a few years earlier,3 8 be37 Id. at 235-37.
38 Supra note 26.
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cause it had been printed serially in a magazine and no copyright
had been obtained. There seems to be no valid distinction. Nor does
it justify the distinction to say that because International News
Service is a competitor of the Associated Press it is therefore not
a member of the general public.
Whether the distinction is valid or not, the publishers of newspapers, even though they do not copyright their paper, seem to
have a special dispensation and are protected from having news
stories pirated for a reasonable length of time by others whose
piratical activities would impair the worth of the news item to
those who originally obtained the information and wrote the story.
This special right seems to be a slender reed on which to support a case, even though the federal courts have adhered to this
expansion of the definition of unfair competition from misrepresentation to include misappropriation, 9 and one court has said:
The right to equitable relief is not confined to cases in
which one man is selling his goods as those of another. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215,
241, 39 Sup. Ct. 68, 63 L.Ed. 211, 2 A.L.R. 293. What in that
case, upon a different state of facts, was said of the respondent, is applicable to defendant's conduct here, for it,
too, "amounts to an unauthorized interference with the
normal operation of complainant's legitimate business precisely at the point when the profit is to be reaped, in order
from those who
to divert a material portion of the profit
40
have earned it to those who have not."
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this expansion by alluding to
the, Associated Press case in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States,4 1 commonly known as the Sick Chicken case. In deciding
that the N.R.A. was unconstitutional, the Court had to determine
the meaning of "fair competition" as used in the act and thus entered into a discussion of unfair competition as known to the common law. The Court said:
"Unfair competition" as known to the common law is a
limited concept. Primarily, and strictly, it relates to the
palming off of one's goods as those of a rival trader. [Citations omitted.] In recent years, its scope has been extended.
It has been held to apply to misappropriation as well as
misrepresentation, to selling of another's goods as one's own
-to misappropriation of what equitably belongs to a competitor. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248
U.S. 215, 241, 242.42
In spite of the importance of the holding of the Associated Press
case it has seldom been cited by the Supreme Court. 43 The Court
has not reaffirmed its holding in the Associated Press case, for the
purpose of protecting literary property after a general publication
on the ground that copying was unfair competition, even when it
39 Coca Cola v. Old Dominion Beverage Corp., 271 Fed. 600 (4th Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 256
U.S. 703 (1921).
40 Id. at 604.
41 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
42 Id. at 531.
43 Shepard's Citator lists ten United States Supreme Court cases which cite the Associated Press
case.
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could have taken the opportunity to do so.44 The lower federal courts
have been equally wary of applying this doctrine if to do so would
broaden its scope in the slightest. This can be seen in the case of
Public Ledger v. New York Times.45 In a bill in equity charging the
New York Times with unfair competition, the Public Ledger alleged that it had a contract with the London Times. The London
Times was to supply the Public Ledger with a copy of important
news items. This service was to be extended exclusively to the
Public Ledger. The plaintiff under his contract could publish or
sell these stories to other newspapers as he deemed advantageous.
One story was late in arriving. Due to this delay, the New York
Times was able to acquire a copy of this story as it appeared in the
London Times, and printed it before the Ledger. The New York
Times credited its source stating that the publication was with the
permission of the London Times. Judge Learned Hand held that
the bill should not be dismissed since unfair competition did exist
if the New York Times did in fact assert in writing that it had the
London Times' permission to use the copy. But Judge Hand expressly stated that the doctrine
of International News Service v.
46
Associated Press did not apply.

Judge Learned Hand gave no reason for his statement that
International News Service v. Associated Press was not in point.
Indeed one would be hard pressed for logical reasons to so hold.
Perhaps the cases are distinguishable on their facts, and perhaps a
group of newspapers acting collectively should be treated differently
from a single newspaper acting under contract with another noncompeting newspaper.
The Associated Press case could have been used as precedent
to change the entire field of statutory copyright by the logical expansion of this doctrine to protect all types of literary property
after a general publication for a reasonable length of time on the
grounds of unfair competition. This was not done. As recently as
44 KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U.S. 269 (1936). In this case a radio station broadcast
news items read from the local paper. Some of these news articles were stories supplied by the
Associated Press. The Supreme Court ordered th- case dismissed on jurisdictional grounds stating that
the amount in controversy was not sufficient. The Court said by way of dicta that it probably did
not have jurisdiction in the Associated Press case either but in that case the question of jurisdiction
was not raised.
45 275 Fed. 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
46The case was appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 279 Fed. 749 (2d
Cir. 1922). The decision in this court concerned only the question of the plaintiff's right to statutory
copyright. The court held that since the plaintiff was neither the creator, nor his assign, he had
no right to copyright the stories.
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1960 the test of "general publication" was used to decide that Ad-

miral Rickover had dedicated some speeches to the public. 4 T This

dedication occurred when Admiral Rickover sent copies of the
speeches he had delivered to friends, persons interested in his topics,
and newspapers for their use. The court held that by so doing, the
Admiral had abandoned his common law rights and since he had
not at that time obtained statutory copyrights he could not later
apply for such rights.
The procedure that must be followed to obtain a statutory copyright is relatively simple and the courts have been, at least recently,
more liberal in their construction of the statute. Nevertheless, notice
of copyright in the first publication is deemed essential to the procurement of a valid statutory copyright. In 1938 the Supreme Court
8
said in the case of Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson:4
The Act of 1909 is a complete revision of the copyright
laws, different from the earlier Act both in scheme and language. It introduced many changes and was intended definitely to grant valuable, enforceable rights to authors,
publishers, etc., without burdensome requirements; "to afford greater encouragement to the production of literary
works of lasting benefit to the world."
Under the old Act deposit of the work was essential to
the existence of copyright. This requirement caused serious
difficulties and unfortunate losses .... The present statute

(§9) declares-"Any person entitled thereto by this Act
may secure copyright for his work by publication thereof
with the notice of copyright required by this Act [ §18] ;..."
And respondents rightly say "It is no longer necessary to
deposit anything to secure a copyright of a published
'49 work,
but only to publish with the notice of copyright.
The Court then holds that the statutory penalty ° for failure to
deposit copies of the work with the registry of copyright as required
by section 13 of the statute, 51 is the only penalty for failure to
deposit.
It must be noted that the Court takes care to point out, in the
instant case, that the notice was published as required by the statute. The liberal interpretation which the copyright statute received
in regard to the requirement of deposit of copies is not and has not
been extended to the requirement of notice which is rigorously
enforced. Notice is the only method of preventing the members of
the public from reaching the conclusion that the author has abandoned all of his literary property rights, and it is essential to the
establishment of valid statutory copyright protection. 52 The statute
describing the method of notification must be strictly complied with
if the notice is to be effective and the copyright valid. Actually,
such compliance with the statute gives notice that the author is
relinquishing his common law literary property rights and is claim47 Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C.
U.S. 841 (1961).
48 306 U.S. 30 (1939).
49 Id. at 36-37.
50 17 U.S.C. j 14 (1947).
51 17 U.S.C. j 13 (1947).
52 Washingtonian Publish.ng Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30 (1939).

Cir. 1960),

cert. granted, 365
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ing statutory rights. If proper notice is not given when a general
publication is made it is conclusively presumed that the author has
abandoned his literary property rights.
The Supreme Court has said: "[T] he object of the [copyright]
statute is to give notice of the copyright to the public, by placing
upon each copy, in some visible shape, the name of the author, the
existence of the claim of exclusive right, and the date at which this
'5 3
right was obtained.
In the case of Shelberg v. Eppingham,5 4 the court held that the
fact that copies of a previously copyrighted literary work had come
into a copier's possession which were not marked with the required
notice was not a good defense in an infringement action when the
pirate had actual notice of the copyright. Yet in the Thrift Plan
case,5 5 the defense that the copyright notice was not in the required
place, but was printed instead on the last page, was good. In this
copyright infringement action, such notice did not meet the statutory requirement and even though there was a strong probability
that the pirate knew of the copyright, actual knowledge was not
proven and the action failed.
The denial of protection to an author for his literary property
rights simply because he neglects or omits to include notice that
he wishes to have his property protected, or because he puts such
notice in the wrong place is ridiculous. To give newspapers a special
dispensation from this requirement of publishing a notice, as the
Supreme Court did in the Associated Press case,5" is equally ridiculous, for it draws a distinction where none should exist. Yet to
expand the scope of the Associated Press case would be to fly in
the face of precedent and statute. It is time that the copyright laws
be revised once more.
Abandonment of the valuable rights of an author in his literary
property should not be conclusively presumed by the fact that the
author has made a general publication and has failed to print a
notice of copyright. Abandonment of these rights should not be
presumed. It is more logical to assume that a man does not wish
to abandon valuable rights than that he does. There are few, if any,
other areas of law where intent to abandon is not important, even
decisive, in determining whether or not there is an abandonment.
Intent to abandon cannot logically be inferred from the fact of
publication. The opposite conclusion is the more logical, yet legally
such intent is presumed.
Abandonment should be made an affirmative defense in an
action for piracy and the person asserting such a defense should
have the burden of proving such abandonment, and intent should
be made an element of abandonment. The fact of publication in
itself should be notice that the author intends to use his intellectual
property to earn a livelihood, and the pirate who attempts to live
on the fruits of another's brain should be forced to legally justify
his actions, or be restrained from copying.
53
54
55
56

Burrow-Oiles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 55 (1884).
36 F.2d 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
United Thrift Plan, Inc. v. National Thrift Plan, Inc., 34 F.2d 300 (E.D.N.Y. 1929).
Supra note 36.
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RECOVERY FOR INJURIES SUFFERED
ON AMUSEMENT DEVICES
BY DONALD E. BLANCHARD*
This note was awarded the 1962 Omar E. Garwood Memorial
Prize of $100 in a competition sponsored by the Association of
Colorado Claimants' Attorneys.
America's rapidly expanding society is providing continually
lengthened hours of leisure for its citizens. Coupled with this availability of free time is the citizens' desire to seek entertaining ways
of spending it. America's ingenuity in all activities is evidenced by
the rapidly growing amusement and sports industry which each year
takes in tremendous sums in dollar volume.
It is to be expected that as more persons participate in amusement and pleasure activities, more of them will suffer injuries which
will be compensable at law. Liability for injuries suffered in places
of public amusement has long been established in America.' However, this paper will not attempt to survey such a general area of
the law; discussion will be restricted in the main to cases arising
out of injuries suffered on amusement devices such as roller coasters, merry-go-rounds, and the like. Reference will be made to other
areas in the amusement field where comparison is thought to be
valuable.
I. BASIS OF LIABILITY
Needless to say liability will result from an intentional tort
committed by the owner or operator of an amusement device as
well as by anyone else. 2 In such cases it may well be that the plaintiff in bringing an action need not show damages; 3 this is in line
with the historical development of the law of intentional torts.
When the owner of an amusement device is sought to be held
liable for the intentional torts of his servant, such liability of course
flows from the principles of the master-servant relationship and
the doctrine of respondeat superior once it is established that the
servant was acting in the scope of his employment. 4 If during the
scope of his employment the servant intentionally injures a patron,
the master may well be held liable. Thus, if employees are stationed
in or near a place of amusement to prevent malicious damage done
by patrons, the master5 will be liable for an assault by these persons
on an innocent patron.
Most of the situations involving intentional torts by servants
occur with regard to the servants' attempts to maintain order. Frequently, the servant involved is a special police officer or a regular
police officer on special duty. If he is hired by the operator of the
* Student, University of Denver College of Low.
1 Most of the early cases involve injuries sustained in an exhibition hall or theater; see, for
example, Currier v. Boston Music Hall Ass'n, 135 Mass. 414 (1883). However, recovery was allowed
for injury suffered in collapse of grandstand at a bicycle race in Fox v. Buffalo Park, 47 N.Y.Supp.
788, 57 N.E. 1109 (Ct. App. 1897); recovery was allowed for injury suffered because of faulty
construction of toboggan slide in Barrett v. Lake Ontario Beach Imp. Co., 174 N.Y. 310, 66 N.E. 968

(1902).

2 Restatement, Torts § 13 (1934).
3 Prosser, Torts 28 n.17 (1955).
4 See text, IV. Who Is Liable.
5 Servants placed in a tunnel to prevent vandalism by persons riding on ride were acting within
the scope of their employment when they mistakenly assaulted a person on the ride. Healey v.
Playland Amusements, 199 So. 682 (La. App. 1941).
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park or the operator of the device or ride there seems to be little
question that the master is liable for an intentional assault by the
officer-his employee.6
A question arises as to the status of these special officers when
it is difficult to tell whether their actions are designed to preserve
peace and order or constitute an arrest for the commission of a
crime. It seems that it is for the jury to decide, under all the evidence of the case, in which capacity the officer is acting at the time
of the incident. 7
Turning to the area of negligence, liability may be based either
on the specific negligence of the operator of the amusement device
or upon a general allegation of negligence with resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
If the plaintiff bases his claim upon a specific act of negligence,
naturally that particular negligence must be proved; this requirement places upon the plaintiff the burden of showing the defendant's knowledge of the defect complained of.8 Knowledge on the
part of the defendant may be shown by actual or constructive
notice.9
In a case involving injury resulting from a fall when the plaintiff stepped on a board which broke under her weight, the court
acknowledged there was no actual notice of the defect but said
constructive notice was present because the condition had existed
(according to the testimony) for a long period of time; the de6 Alamo Downs, Inc. v. Briggs, 106 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Hirst v. Fitchburg &
L. St. Ry., 196 Mass. 353, 82 N.E. 10 (1907).
7 Neallus v. Hutch'inson Amusement Co., 126 Me. 469, 139 AtI. 671 (1928).
8 Berberet v. Electric Park Amusement Co., 319 Mo. 275, 3 S.W.2d 1025 (1928). As to the duty
owed, the violation of which constitutes the negligence, see text, IV. Who Is Liable.
9 Junkermonn v. Tilyou Realty Co., 213 N.Y. 404, 108 N.E. 190 (1915).
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fendant's employees should have discovered the defect in time to
remedy it.

1°

In a case for injuries suffered by a bowler in a fall on a wet
runway, the court said the proprietor, to be liable, must have either
actual or constructive notice of the existence of the water on the
floor, and constructive notice is chargeable only where the defect
has existed for a sufficient length of time."'
The injury complained of in a case may be the result of intentional or careless conduct of third persons, and in such cases the
negligence of the defendant consists of a failure to provide reasonably safe premises for public use.'2 Most of such cases involve
action amusements such as skating. If the defendant or his employees are on duty at the place of amusement, they will be deemed
to have notice of the dangerous conduct of participants. 1 3 Also,
without presence of the defendant or his employees in viewing the
registered by participants will
dangerous conduct, actual complaint
14
place the defendant on notice.
If the amusement involves the bumping of others as part of
the game (such as on self driver "Dodgem" cars), recovery may
not be allowed for injuries alleged to have been received as a result
of being bumped. 15 However, the facts of a particular case may
warrant recovery against the proprietor of such a device where he
or his employees know of particularly dangerous conduct on the
part of some drivers. 16
Another point should be made with regard to the situation,
where the plaintiff's case is based on some specific act of negligence.
A judgment for the plaintiff was reversed in a recent case because
the instructions to the jury were at variance with the allegation
and the proof in the case. 17 The complaint was based on the fact
that the operator had speeded up the device and caused it to jerk
thereby injuring the plaintiff; the evidence tended to prove this
negligent operation. However, the instructions were worded to predicate liability on negligent maintenance of the device to prevent
injury. No proof had been offered on this, and the inclusion of such
instruction was reversible error.
II.

USE OF THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR

Pleading acts of specific negligence such as negligent operation,
maintenance or construction or failure to inspect, and the offer of
proof on these allegations will not prevent the plaintiff from also
relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.'8 If the plaintiff offers
sufficient evidence of specific negligence to satisfy his burden of
10 Long v. Savin Rock Amusement Co., 141 Conn. 150, 104 A.2d 221 (1954).
In this case the
court pointed out that the greater the likelihood cf danger, the greater the amount of care which
is required. The board in question here was in a damp area; it was subject to continued wetting;
and it was unpainted. From these facts the jury could reasonably find that a reasonable inspection
would reveal the defect in question, and therefore constructive notice could be imputed to the
defendant.
11 Reiher v. Mandernack, 234 Wis. 568, 291 N.W. 758 (1940).
12 As to the duty owed, the violation of which constitutes the negligence, see text, IV. Who Is
Liable.
13 Thomas v. Studio Amusements, Inc., 50 Cal.App.2d 538, 123 P.2d 552 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942).
14 Murphy v. Winter Garden & Ice Co., 280 S.W. 444 (Mo. App. 1926).
15 Gardner v. G. Howard Mitchell, Inc., 107 N.J.L. 311, 153 AtI. 607 (Ct. Err. & App. 1931).
16 Connolly v. Palisades Realty & Amusement Co., 11 N.J. Misc. 841, 168 AtI. 419 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
In this case the court pointed out that a person takes the chance of injury through normal operation,
but he does not take the chance of conduct of others in violation of the rules and which is known
by the proprietor to endanger safety.
17 Bee's Old Reliable Shows, Inc. v. Maupin's Adm'x, 311 Ky. 837, 226 S.W.2d 23 (1950).
18 Harrison v. Southeastern Fair Ass'n, 104 Ga.App. 596, 122 S.E.2d 330 (1961).
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proof including that to withstand the defendant's rebuttal, naturally
the plaintiff need not rely on res ipsa loquitur to get to the jury.',
His case should in that situation go to the jury on specific negligence.
Confusion seems to arise in those cases where plaintiff pleads
some acts which could be classified as specific negligence, such as
negligent maintenance, and also attempts to rely on the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur. In one case the plaintiff received a severe burn
on her hip which was allegedly inflicted when she was forced
against the side of a metal car on the device on which she was
riding. There was specific testimony as to the cause of the heat at
that point on the car-faulty guide wheels on the outside rubbed
against the car generating heat from the friction. The introduction
of much evidence did not remove
the plaintiff's right to use the
20
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur also.

In another case the defendant received a directed verdict in its
favor at the close of the plaintiff's case. The grounds were that the
plaintiff's evidence failed to prove any knowledge on the part of
the defendant of the defect complained of and therefore was insufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's burden of proof. The case was
reversed on appeal. 1 The court indicated that the plaintiff need
not plead the facts to establish res ipsa loquitur as long as the court
and opposing party are apprised of its applicability, and the elements necessarily
present to justify its use are adduced by the
2
plaintiff. '

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be effectively used where
there are multiple defendants. 23 Frequently, the plaintiff will join
the lessee or concessionaire operating an amusement device as well
as the owner of the park or premises. In a New York case,'24 although
the independent contractor was not joined as a defendant, the suit
against the proprietor, state of New York, was allowed on the basis
of res ipsa loquitur even though the independent contractor operated the device. The court said, "It is not necessary ... that there
be but a single person in control of that" instrument causing the
damage.
It should be pointed out, however, that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is no cure-all for a doubtful case. Two recent cases may be
examined to illustrate this in regard to two aspects-a case of possible mechanical failure and a case wherein the injury was due to
no mechanical defect.
In the first of these situations, the plaintiff was severely burned
while riding on a Loop-O-Plane. 5 The seat caught fire. The plaintiff
19 None of the cases examined discuss the possible difference in the use of the doctrine of res
ipso foquitur as to whether it is treated as raising a presumption or creating an inference. Since
none of the cases examined on amusement injuries makes the point, no effort will be made here to
discuss the question of evidence presented.
20 Harrison v. Southeastern Fair Ass'n, 104 Ga.App. 596, 122 S.E.2d 330 (1961).
21 Pierce v. Gooding Amusement Co., 90 N.E.2d 585 (Ohio App. 1949). Plaintiff was holding a
baby on a merry-go-round horse. The horse come loose and knocked plaintiff to the ground.
22 In the Pierce case, supra note 21, the court listed three elements as necessary for reliance on
the doctrine of res ipso foquitur: (a) the instrumentality be under the exclusive control and managenent of the defendant; (b) the means of explaining the accident and the availability of the evidence
be accessible only to the defendant; and (c) upon the facts adduced, the accident be of a type
which the jury could find would ordinarily occur only as a result of the defendant's negligence.
It is interesting to note that the court makes no mention of a fourth element usually required in
res ipso loquitur cases; that is, no contribution by the plaintiff to the happening. Prosser, Torts
208 (1955).
23 Harrison v. Southeastern Fair Ass'n, 104 Go.App. 596, 122 S.E.2d 330 (1961).
24 Covey v. State, 200 Misc. 340, 106 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
25 Hicks v. Fontaine Ferry Enterprises, Inc., 247 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. App. 1952).
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relied on res ipsa loquitur. That there was an unusual occurrence
was not questioned; nor was the exclusive control of the device
by the defendant contradicted. However, in spite of expert testimony by witnesses for the plaintiff that the fire could have resulted
from hot oil flowing along the shaft of the device from the engine,
the court directed a verdict for the defendant. The decision was
based on the fact that the plaintiff failed to prove that the accident
more likely than not was'a result of the defendant's negligence.
It seems that with the testimony as to a possible cause of the
fire, the plaintiff had established his case well enough to get to the
jury on res ipsa loquitur. What more could plaintiff do in such a
situation? It is highly likely that such an unusual occurrence would
result only from the negligence of someone. By showing that the
fire was possibly caused by a defective mechanism in the motor,
the plaintiff has tied the negligence closely enough to the defendant.
For this reason, it seems the opinion may be questioned.
In a recent Colorado case 2 6 the plaintiff was denied recovery
for injuries to her back allegedly incurred as a result of the negligent maintenance and operation of a Loop-O-Plane. The evidence
showed that the plaintiff was unable to hold onto a safety bar in
front of her, but this resulted from the natural effect of the forces
produced by the device.2 7 She contended that the accident resulted
from the defendants' failure to securely fasten the seat belt. However, evidence on the insecure fastening of the seat belt was unclear.
In discussing the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
the court said that it was inapplicable because of:
the insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence to establish
the ingredients of the claim. In order for the doctrine to fill
the breach-it must appear (1) that the instrumentality is
under the exclusive control of the defendant, (2) that the
accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of defendant's negligence, (3) that it must not have
been due to any
voluntary act or contribution on the part
28
of the plaintiff.

Plaintiff failed to satisfy (2) and (3) above. The accident was
not a kind to bespeak negligence; and it was explainable in terms
26 Hook v. Lakeside Park Co., 142 Colo. 277,
27 The Loop-O-Plane is a device consisting of
to back-oattoched to a long arm which rotates
clockwise and counterclockwise.
28 Hook v. Lakeside Park Co., 142 Colo. 277,

it

351 P.2d 261 (1960).
a two seated car in which the passengers sit back
in a circle on a vertical plane. It operates both
288, 351 P.2d 261, 268 (1960).
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of causes which were not tortious. In fact, "the happening is not
such as to point to negligence as the predominant or even the equal
explanation, and so the vagueness and ambiguousness of plaintiff's
of res ipsa
evidence operates to defeat her claim, and the doctrine
'29
loquitur does not serve to supply the deficiencies.
III. DEFENSES AVAILABLE
The operator of an amusement device has available the defense
of plaintiff's own conduct to defeat liability. The two common defenses, of course, are contributory negligence and assumption of
risk. Mention will later be made of another defense sometimes asserted--contractual limitation.
Turning first to contributory negligence, recovery has often
been denied on this ground. In the cases involving roller coasters,
the conduct of the plaintiff is usually that of failing to properly seat
himself in the car. In one case the plaintiff sat on the arm of the
seat and was thrown off the roller coaster on a curve; this was
held to be contributory negligence. 30 Again, if a patron is riding on
a roller coaster with only one hand on the safety bar and the other
hand around his companion's shoulder, even without knowledge
of the31hazards of the ride this may amount to contributory negligence.
It should be pointed out, however, that the existence of other
factors may still allow recovery by the plaintiff. There may be
evidence of mechanical failure or negligent operation as well as
was
evidence of contributory negligence. In one case the plaintiff
injured as a result of a violent jerk of a roller coaster. 32 The defendant pleaded contributory negligence in that the plaintiff allegedly failed to make proper use of a safety bar. Since there was
credible evidence as to both contentions, the appellate court refused
to disturb the finding that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury.
This holding and another 33 illustrate the rule that the question
of contributory negligence is for the jury. In the latter case recovery
by the plaintiff was sustained even though she stepped into the
path of a miniature train which allegedly sounded its whistle. It
was possible that the warning blended into the sounds from the
other concessions and went unheard.
Naturally, the defense of contributory negligence should not
be presented to the jury if the defendant has not introduced evidence to establish it. In a recent case involving injury on a "Shoot
The Chute" device, the trial court gave four contributory negligence
instructions concerning the plaintiff's posture in the device; and
the verdict was for the defendant. 34 This was reversed on appeal
because the defendant had introduced no evidence as to what might
be correct posture or that the plaintiff had been told how to sit.
The court had merely instructed the jury that if it believed the
plaintiff had failed to seat himself correctly, he could not recover.
This was error.
29
30
31
32
33
34

Id. at 289, 351 P.2d at 268.
State ex rel. Hamel v. Glen Echo Park Co., 137 Md. 529, 113 AtI. 85 (1921).
Pointer v. Mountain Ry. Constr. Co., 269 Mo. 104, 189 S.W. 805 (1916).
Sanderson v. Bob's Coaster Corp., 133 Conn. 677, 54 A.2d 270 (1947).
Bates v. Siebrand Bros.Circus & Carnival, 71 Idaho 318, 231 P.2d 747 (1951).
Reynolds v. Phare, 365 P.2d 328 (Wash. 1961).
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Frequently, of course, the defense of contributory negligence
will be of no avail because of the fact the plaintiff is a minor. The
general rule is that a child is bound only to use that degree of care
which ordinarily prudent children of a like age and like intelligence
are accustomed to use under the circumstances. 5 In the case cited
above the child's conduct was such that under the circumstances,
similar conduct on the part of an adult might have constituted contributory negligence, but since the child was nine years old, his
care and foresight were measured by a rule different from that
applicable to an adult.
As the age of the plaintiff increases, however, the degree of
care required of him also approaches that required of an adult, and
recovery may be barred by the plaintiff's own conduct. 36 In an ilten years old, but fully
lustrative case the injured child was only
37
capable of reading a sign of warning.
Turning next to the defense of assumption of risk, often where
such defense is used, it too will be ineffective if the plaintiff is a
child. A child assumes the risk only of dangers the existence of
which he knew, or which in the exercise of a degree of care applicable to8 children of the same age and intelligence, he ought to have
known.1

The classic illustration of the application of the doctrine of
assumption of risk in general was presented by Judge Cardozo in
39
the New York case of Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co.
In that case the plaintiff was thrown from a moving belt device
called "The Flopper," and he suffered a broken knee cap. The
plaintiff's case rested on the negligence of the defendant's operation of the device which produced a sharp or sudden jerk. Judgment
for the plaintiff was reversed.
There was in this case no question of an obscure or unobserved
danger. People were observed to fall; the belt was in constant motion. In such cases where the dangers are obvious to all and, in
fact, are part of the amusement sought, the patron takes the chance
As Judge Cardozo stated: "The timorous
of injury upon himself.
' 40
may stay at home.

The situation of observable dangers is also well illustrated by
a recent case of injury on a Loop-O-Plane ride.4 1 The plaintiff was
denied recovery because she had observed the ride and knew how
it operated. There was no negligence in the operation of the device.
Because the risks of such a ride are natural and obvious, no special
warnings need be given to patrons.
Proceeding from this situation to others less clear, the efficacy
of the defense of assumption of risk may not be great. The general
rule is that a patron assumes the usual risks ordinarily to be encountered but not those risks engendered
42 by negligence in operation
or resulting from defective equipment.
35 Brown v. Rhoades, 126 Me. 186, 137 Atl. 58 (1927).
36 See, for example, the case of a fifteen year old boy climbing on a merry-go-round, Abbot v.
Alabama Power Co., 214 Ala. 281, 107 So. 811 (1926).
37 Ainsworth v. Murphy, 5 La.App. 103 (1926).
38 Brown v. Rhoades, 126 Me. 186, 137 AtI. 58 (1927).
39 250 N.Y. 479, 166 N.E. 173 (1929).
40 Id. at 483, 166 N.E. at 174.
41 Vance v. Obadol, 256 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953). See also Hook v. Lakeside Park Co._
142 Colo. 277, 351 P.2d 261 (1961).
42 Stockweather v. Buck, 277 App.Div. 835, 97 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1950); Beaulieu v. Lincoln Rides.
Inc., 328 Mass. 427, 104 N.E.2d 417 (1952).
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In one New York case the intermediate appellate court held
that a patron on a miniature automobile ride assumed the risk of
even a defective steering wheel, but the decision was reversed on
appeal to 43the court of appeals, and judgment for plaintiff was
reinstated.

Two cases involving rides on a "whip" device 44 illustrate another situation where the defense of assumption of risk may not
be effective. 45 The plaintiffs were injured as a result of being
thrown from the device. In both cases it is indicated that a patron
does not, as a matter of law, assume such a risk by merely riding
on the device. Being thrown out of the car was not part of the game.
Even where the injury is not a result of such a comparatively
unusual accident as being thrown from a device, it is for the jury
to decide if the plaintiff "assumed the risk encountered. 46 In the
cited case the injury was sustained as a result of a sudden jerk on
a roller coaster. In another case where the defendant raised the
defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk, recovery
for the plaintiff was sustained in spite of evidence that the plaintiff
was riding backwards without using the safety strap.
The con47
troverted question of fact is for the jury to decide.
However, in yet another case very similar to those just discussed, it was held that the plaintiff had assumed the risks of a
roller coaster ride.48 The lurch of the car which threw the plaintiff
from the coaster was not shown to be unusual.
It is interesting to compare the use of the doctrine of assumption of risk in amusement park cases with its use in a case of an
injury from a sport involving a much greater hazard. In a 1949 New
York case involving an injury suffered on a bobsled run, the lower
court indicated that the plaintiff assumed not only the risk of bobsledding, but also the risk of consequential injuries or damages,
whether or not he could have foreseen them. 49 "It may well be that
known dangers of exposure to cold and the possibilities of delay in
hospitalization were inherent in the risk assumed." 50 The plaintiff
claimed that his injuries were aggravated because of lack of prompt
medical treatment, the use of a pickup truck as an ambulance, and
the failure of the defendant's agents to properly warm him while
transporting him to a hospital. Dismissal of the plaintiff's claim
was affirmed on appeal. 51
Sometimes the tickets used at amusement parks have a statement printed thereon which attempts to limit the liability of the
owner on account of injuries suffered by patrons riding a device.
Although such limitations may lawfully exempt the owner from
liability for negligence in the operation of the device, such limitation must be so communicated to the patron to bring it to his attention. 52 If the ticket has the appearance of a mere check or token

43 Branch v. Bug Ride, Inc., 297 N.Y. 623, 75 N.E.2d 634 (1947).
44 A "Whip" is a device consisting at several small cars which whirl in either direction as the
car proceeds along a winding track.
45 Stockweather v. Buck, 277 App.Div. 835, 97 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1950); Beaulieu v. Lincoln Rides,
Inc., 328 Mass. 427, 104 N.E.2d 417 (1952).
48 Schnoor v. Palisades Realty & Amusement Co., 112 N.J.L.506, 172 Atli. 43 (Ct. Err. & App.
1934). Also see note 16, supra.
47 Moore v. Rosecliff Realty Corp., 88 F.Supp. 956 (D. N.J. 1950).
48 Lumsden v. L.A. Thompson Scenic R.R., 130 App.Div. 209, 114 N.Y.Supp. 421 (1909).
49 Clark v. State, 276 App.Div. 10, 93 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1949).
50 Id. at 13, 93 N.Y.S.2d at 31.
51 Clark v. State, 302 N.Y. 795, 99 N.E.2d 300 (1951).
52 Kushner v. McGinnis, 289 Mass. 326, 194 N.E. 106 (1935).
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and is to be collected by the owner on admission to the ride, the
chances are that the attempted limitation of liability will not be
effective. It must be brought home to the patron in such a manner
that a person of ordinary intelligence would understand it."
IV.

WHO Is LIABLE

Having.established a basis for liability, a claimant has to decide
against whom suit should be brought. The balance of this discussion
will direct attention to this question.
Naturally the owner of an amusement device should be a defendant. His liability flows from a violation of the duty owed by a
proprietor of such device to invitees on his premises. The proprietor
is required to exercise that degree of care to prevent injury to his
invitees which a reasonably prudent person would exercise under
the same circumstances. 54 Failure to do so is negligence.
The courts in the early cases refrained from charging a proprietor of a place of public amusement with a higher duty than
that of reasonable care.5 5 However, he is held to a stricter accounting than the owners of private property in general. This stricter
accounting involves the obligation to know that the premises are
safe for public use.5 6
With the passage of time and the increase in the number of
cases there appears to have been a modification of the ordinary
care standard. In a case of injury suffered on a slide device the
court said that the degree of care required of one operating an
amusement device is higher than ordinary care.5 7 It is care proportionate to the risk involved and the circumstances, and one of the
circumstances is that he invites people to ride on the device,
and by
58
that impliedly holds out that they can do it with safety.
This raising of the degree of care required of operators of
amusement rides is not general, however. Some jurisdictions still
adhere to the prevailing rule that the standard
is a reasonable pre59
caution to avoid injury, or ordinary care.
53
54
55
56
5T

Brennan v. Ocean View Amusement Co., 289 Mass. 587, 194 N.E. 911 (1935).
New Bay Shore Corp. v. Lewis, 193 Va. 400, 69 S.E.2d 320 (1952).
Williams v. Mineral City Park Ass'n, 128 Iowa 32, 102 N.W. 783 (1905).
Smith v. Cumberland County Agricultural Soc'y, 163 N.C. 346, 79 S.E. 632 (1913).
Kehoe v. Central Park Amusement Co., 52 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1931).

58 Ibid.

59 See, for example, Hook v. Lakeside Park Co., 142 Colo. 277, 351 P.2d 261
McNally, 324 Mass. 385, 86 N.E.2d 638 (1949).
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The standards just discussed have not applied generally to operators of roller coasters. These devices have been recognized as
sources of great peril, and the proprietors have been held to the
standard of exercising the highest care. 60 It is the same degree of
care required of common carriers.61
That this standard of highest care may be extended to the
owners of devices other than roller coasters is indicated by a recent
case involving injuries suffered when a cable broke on an "airplane
ride."62 In that case the defendant objected to an instruction charging him with the duty to operate the ride with the highest degree
of care of a very prudent person engaged in a like business. On
appeal, the instruction was held to be proper.
In one case the operator attempted to relieve himself of the
liability for injuries suffered- on his amusement device because of
the fact that the plaintiff had received a free ride. 63 The defendant
operator received a directed verdict in the trial court which was
reversed on appeal. The court pointed out that the offer of free
rides was not a pure gratuity but was used to induce people to
patronize the device. Therefore, there was business advantage
enough to the defendant to charge him with ordinary negligence.
In large amusement parks the situation is most likely that the
owner's (operator's) servant, rather than the owner himself, is in
actual physical control of the device. If an injury results from the
intentional act or the negligence of such servant, the servant is
64
liable under elementary tort law.

As indicated in the early part

of this paper the owner also could be joined as a defendant in a
suit for such torts of one of his servants if the act occurred while
the servant was acting within the scope of his authority; liability
of the master is based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. 65
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the agency problems concerned with the determination of whether or not the master-servant relationship exists. General agency law indicates that
there needs to be a contract of employment (express or implied)
between competent parties resulting in the master's direction and
control of the servant's performance of services for compensation.
The determination in a given case is a question of fact.
As a practical matter it would appear that when a servant's
actions are involved, he should be joined as a party so that all of
the parties may be before the court in the first place. Recovery
may, be had against all of them.6 6 Thus, the plaintiff has a greater
opportunity for satisfaction of his judgment. It may very well work
out that the servant has no assets to reach, but he should be joined. 67
In addition to the owner of the amusement device and the
servant, if he is involved, the owner of the premises or land may
60 Sand Springs Park v. Shroder, 82 Okla. 244, 198 Pac. 983 (1921).
61 Best Park & Amusement Co. v. Rollins, 192 Ala. 534, 68 So. 417 (1915); Bibeau v. Fred W.
Pearce Corp., 173 Minn. 331, 217 N.W. 374 (1928).
62 Gromowsky v. Ingusal, 241 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. App. 1951).
63 Beaulieu v. Lincoln Rides, Inc., 328 Mass. 427, 104 N.E.2d 417 (1952).
64 See text, I. Basis of Liability.
65 Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 1066 (1958).
66 Davidson v. Long Beach Pleasure Pier Co., 99 CaI.App.2d 384, 221 P.2d 1005 (Dist. Ct. App.
1950).
67 There will be no discussion of the effects of insurance in a case. That may influence plaintiff's
choice of procedure, but it does not technically affect liability.
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well be a proper party to join as a defendant. Ordinarily a lessor
is not liable for the injuries sustained by a tenant's invitees on the
leased premises.6 8 However, there has been developed an exception
to this rule which might be called an amusement park exception.
The proprietor of a place of public amusement is required to maintain in a reasonably safe condition all the devices used 69on the premises, and to reasonably inspect and supervise them. The duty
imposed upon the lessor is not discharged because the injury re-°
sulted from the activity of an independent concessionaire or lessee.
The cases generally point out the fact that the lessor or owner
liability,
of the park receives an admission fee from all patrons, and
in consequence, is established from this arrangement.7 1 The same
result is established where the owner receives a rental72 involving
a percentage of the gross receipts of the concessionaire. It seems,
also, that a lessee who subleases premises to73 an independent sublessee will be held liable on the same basis.
The extent of the duty owed by the lessor deserves yet further
emphasis. As indicated by the Restatement of the Law of Torts,
cited above, the lessor's care must extend not only to construction
and installation of safe equipment but also to seeing to its proper
use even if an independent contractor is involved. As stated by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court: "The important fact is that the
[device] was operated in the park owned and operated by the
[lessor], who invited the public to become patrons of the amusement devices. ' 74 The court went on to point out that the duty owed
was reasonable care in the construction, maintenance, and management of the device.
There are possible grounds by which the lessor or landowner
may escape liability. In the first instance, the landowner may donate the use of the land to the amusement operator. In a Massachusetts case for damages for the death of a child at a charity carnival, the landowner was not held liable even though 75the child was
killed on part of the land not used by the carnival. The benefit
to the landowner of receiving admissions or rental was removed;
and at best the persons attending were in the position of licensees,
and the landowner could not be charged with knowledge that the
use a portion of the land not intended for use by the
child would
76
carnival.

68 Gentry v. Taylor, 182 Tenn. 223, 185 S.W.2d 521 (1945).
69 Davidson v. Long Beach Pleasure Pier Co., 99 CaI.App.2d 384, 221 P.2d 1005 (Dist. Ct. App.
1950); Gibson v. Shelby County Fair Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1349, 44 N.W.2d 362 (1950).
70 Engstrom v. Huntley, 345 Pa. 10, 26 A.2d 461 (1942); Wodnik v. Luna Park Amusement Co.,
69 Wash. 638, 125 Pac. 941 (1912). The former case cites with approval Restatement, Torts §§ 344,
415 (1934). Section 344 reads: "A possessor of land who holds it 0pen to the entry of the public
for his business purposes is subject to liability to members af the public entering for such purposes
for bodily harm caused to them by his failure to exercise a reasonably careful supervision of the
appliances or methods of an independent contractor or concessionaire whom he has employed or
permitted to carry on upon the land an activity which is directly or indirectly connected with his
business use thereof." Section 415 states: "A possessor of land who in the course of his business
holds it open to members of the public, is subiect to liability for bodily harm caused to them, on
a part of the land retained in his possession or upon a part thereof leased to a concessionaire, by
his failure to exercise reasonable care to secure the use of reasonably safe equipment and methods
by an . . . (b) independent contractor or concessionaire employed or permitted to carry on upon
the land an activity in furtherance of the possessor's business use thereof."
71 Stickle v. Riverv.ew Sharpshooters Park Co., 250 III. 452, 95 N.E. 445 (1911); Covey v. State,
200 Misc. 340, 106 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
72 Davidson v. Long Beach Pleasure Pier Co., 99 Cal.App.2d 384, 221 P.2d 1005 (Dist. Ct. App.
1950); Wodnik v. Luna Park Amusement Co., 69 Wash. 638, 125 Pac. 941 (1912).
73 Murphy v. Electric Park Amusement Co., 209 Mo.App. 638, 241 S.W. 651 (1922).
74 Engstrom v. Huntley. 345 Pa. 10, 12, 26 A.2d 461, 463 (1942).
75 Karlowski v. Kissock, 275 Mass. 180, 175 N.E. 500 (1931).
76 Id. at 183, 175 N.E. at 501.
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In the second place where the lessor parts with all control over
the premises he has been held not liable. A recent case illustrates
this. The plaintiff was injured by a defective stool in a lunch room
at an amusement park. It was shown the lessor received no percentage of the receipts, and that the lunchroom was in the exclusive
control of the defendant. 77 It seems that this holding may be criticized because the plaintiff was an invitee of the landlord to the park
grounds. Where so many people are congregated on the landowner's
grounds and he receives admission fees from them, it would appear
that the duty of continuing inspection should run to all the facilities
to apply the amusement
of the park. However, the court declined
78
park exception in the plaintiff's favor.
A third instance of nonliability is provided by another Massachusetts case.79 The plaintiff was injured while riding a "Whip"
device on a "free ride." In the lower court the defendant operator
and defendant park company received directed verdicts. As to the
operator, this was reversed on appeal because the free ride was
an inducement to get people to ride-similar to free samples. Only
some business advantage need be shown to charge the defendant
with negligence. This was not a pure gratuity; some business advantage was here found. However, the court said there was no
evidence that the park company was in any way responsible for
the plaintiff's injury. Outside of this statement no authority was
given to excuse the landowner from liability. Contrary to the outcome, there was evidence that all the rides in the park were free,
and that the free rides were used to induce people to attend. The
resulting benefit extended to the landlord, and the liability attached
to the benefit should have been the park company's burden as well
as the operator's.8 0
In some situations there may yet be another escape from liability, and that is by means of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
77 Gentry v. Taylor, 182 Tenn. 223, 185 S.W.2d 521 (1945).
78 The court in the Gentry case, ibid., indicated that the liability of the landowner is limited to
these cases: (a) where he has an interest more or less substantial; (b) where he exercises, or has
the right to exercise, some control over the oprntion; (c) where he holds out to the public that he
is interested in the ownership or control to induce patronage; (d) where the lessee operates an
inherently dangerous

dcv ce which creates

a nondelegoole

ducy on the part of the landowner; and

It seems the court could have favored
(e) where a defect existed at the time of the lease.
the plaintiff by applying (a) or (c) above.
79 Beaulieu v. Lincoln Rides, Inc., 328 Mass. 427, 104 N.E.2d 417 (1952).
80 Massachusetts' landlords have been charged with and found liable for the torts of their
independent contractors: Brandolino v. Carrig, 312 Mass. 295, 44 N.E.2d 788 (1942).
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This doctrine, of course, applies to situations in which there is a
governmental unit acting as the landowner or lessor of the park
in question. It is not the purpose here to explore the whole area
to illustrate how it affects liability in
of sovereign immunity, but
the area under discussion.81
Turning first to the situation in which a state is the lessor involved and the state has given its consent to be sued in tort, it may
be liable under the same principles as a private landowner in an
amusement park case.8 2 In a recent New York case the plaintiff
recovered from the state for injuries sustained while she was observing a "scooter ride" in a state park. The state had collected an
admission fee. The court pointed out that the liability for the negligence of the concessionaire falls on an owner who charges a general
state of New York, acting through its
admission, in this case 8 the
3
agriculture department.
Although the doctrine of governmental immunity is falling
into disfavor in some jurisdictions, where it does exist it is applicable to suits against state agencies as well as against the state
itself.8 4 In those jurisdictions 5a recovery for any tort injury would
be precluded by the doctrine.
When one finds a subsidiary governmental unit such as a
county or a municipality running an amusement park, the problem
becomes complicated because of the need to determine whether or
not a governmental function is being performed by the county or
municipality. Under the rules applicable in this field of sovereign
immunity, such sub-units of government occupy a dual positionthey are endowed with strict governmental powers as a branch
of the state government, and yet they are also corporate entities
subject, in a way, to the same requirements as private corporations.8 6 Determining which function is served in the case of a city
maintaining a park with amusement devices therein presents a nice
question.
The early cases seem to show a pronounced split of authority
as to what function a municipality performs in the establishment
and maintenance of public parks in general. Illustrative of the rule
that this is a governmental function is the statement in a Kentucky
case that parks are essentially public places established for public
purposes, and municipal corporations are not liable in tort for
injuries to visitors.8 7 Even when the injuries are inflicted by animals in88a zoo or on playground equipment, such has been the
holding.
However, the contrary view that the city is performing a
proprietary function has much support. 89 This has frequently been
held when the injuries complained of resulted from the failure of
the city to construct or maintain amusement equipment in a reasonably safe manner. An early Colorado case held that if the city via
81 For a resume of the entire area of sovereign immunity refer to Prosser, Torts § 109 (1955).
82 Id. at 773.
83 Covey v. State, 200 Misc. 340, 106 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Ct. C1. 1951).
84 Taylor v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 22 N.J. 454, 126 A.2d 313 (1956).
85 Prosser, Torts 771 (1955).
86 Id. at 774.
ST Park Comm'rs v. Prinz, 127 Ky. 460, 105 S.W. 948 (1907).
88 As to animals, see Hibbard v. Wichita, 98 Kan. 498, 159 Pac. 399 (1916); as to playground
equipment, see Bernstein v. Milwaukee, 158 Wis. 576, 149 N.W. 382 (1914).
89 Carey v. Kansas City, 187 Mo. 715, 86 S.W. 438 (1905).
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its agents was negligent in the maintenance of a merry-go-round
in a public park, the city would be liable if such negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury 9 0
Where the municipality conducts its public parks for revenue,
will be held liable for defective condiit seems clear that the city
tions existing in the park.91
Two cases involving miniature train rides provide interesting
illustrations. In a California case the plaintiff was denied recovery
from the defendant city; the court held that under the facts of the
and
case the city was clearly acting in a governmental capacity
hence was not liable for injuries resulting from negligence 92 The
case makes no mention as to whether the city charged a fee for
rides on the train.
A Michigan case involving similar facts was decided in favor
of the plaintiff who had paid a fare for riding on the train, although she had been charged no admission to the park itself.93
The court in this case very nicely divided the operation of running
the park as governmental from the operation of the train which
was held to be a proprietary function even though the total fares
received from rides did not offset the total operating deficit of the
park. The court noted that although governmental immunity is
lost when a city receives income from one of its functions, that
is not the case where the income is merely incidental to the overall
purpose.9 4 This exception did not apply in this case because the ride
itself did operate at a profit in spite of the loss sustained on the
overall operation of the park.
It would seem that in those cases where the municipality is
operating strictly as a lessor and receives rental from concessionaires the rule applying to state governments would be applied
to the cities. 95 Clearly, the city is acting in a proprietary capacity.
If, however, the city is not operating the park but leases the entire
There are cases
facility to an outsider there may be some doubt.
indicating that either result may be reached. 96
90 Canon City v. Cox, 55 Colo. 264, 133 Pac. 1040 (1913).
91 Cornelisen v. Atlanta, 146 Go. 416, 91 $.E. 415 (1917).
92 Meyer v. City & County of Son Francisco, 9 Cal.App.2d 361, 49 P.2d 893 (Dist. Ct. App. 1935).
93 Matthews v. City of Detroit, 291 Mich. 161, 289 N.W. 115 (1939).
94 Id. at 165, 289 N.W. at 117.
95 See Covey v. State, 200 Misc. 340, 106 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
96 See, for example, Dean v. Board of Trustees, 65 Ohio App. 362, 29 N.E.2d 910 (1940), indi.
cating that the benefit of the rentals would be enough to hold the city liable because it was acting
in a proprietary capacity. For the opposite result in a case involving inuries suffered in a city
recreation hall leased to a private group for a fee, see Ramirez v. Ogden City, 3 Utah 2d 102, 279
P.2d 463 (1955).
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BOOK REVIEW
WRITE ME A VERBAL CONTRACT. By W. Robert Abbott. Charlottsville: The Michie Company, 1962. Pp. 160. $3.50.
Lawyers seldom tell jokes to other lawyers. The stuff of intraprofessional humor is the infinite variety of humanity migrating
through the lawyer's world leaving spoor through the pages of the
National Reporter System. To the non-initiate in the legal fraternity
the punch line of this brand of humor is often lost in a morass of
technical terminology not part of the public domain. Occasionally
lawyers condescend to spin tales for the mass audience. Anatomy
of a Murder is an outstanding example of the best of this condescension. The used book stores are full of privately printed first edition copies of the worst. Thus when one hears of a new book by a
lawyer, especially a new book of amusing anecdotes from the practice of a small town lawyer, all of the defenses are thrown up and
a "show me" attitude comes to the fore. Write Me a Verbal Contract
is one of the very latest efforts by a lawyer to tell lawyer tales
to the general book buying public. This time the setting is the West
Virginia hills and the lawyers and their clients are the descendants
of the original mountain men who took the first giant steps west
from the tide water colonies. One would expect to find in such a
book a soggy collection of hillbillies and stills with Snuffy Smith
overtones. Yet such is not the fact. Instead of broad slapstick one
finds between the covers of this little book a very human collection
of quiet good humor. The stories can be understood by the laymen
yet clearly they are written by a lawyer for other lawyers; they
smack of truth. The lawyer reader is more apt to be reminded of
his own experiences and derive pleasure from such past remembrances than is the lay reader. Thus this book functions on two
levels - to the lawyer it is a spring board to pleasant recollection,
to the non-lawyer it is a collection of funny stories about lawyers
and their clients.
The reviewer has a special interest in the book stemming from
two facts: He knows the lawyer and has substantial personal admiration for Mr. Abbott, its author, and he saw many of the stories
in the book as they unfolded. It is thus somewhat surprising to find
Mr. Abbott including among these choice few tales one discordant
note. He inserts a story about a lawyer and a toy satellite that
strains the reader's credulity. Surely such a chain of events could
never have happened and Mr. Abbott should be taken to task for
its inclusion. Aside from this one obvious fabrication Mr. Abbott
has compiled a most pleasant collection of tales. Too many reviews
suggest that the reader should rush out and purchase the book immediately for without it no library would be complete. This reviewer shall not thus bow to true tradition. He flatly states that you
could spend the balance of your life without purchasing the bookwhile you are at it why not give up women, cigarettes and liquor
too? Or if you prefer the hedonistic existence then rush right out
and buy Write Me a Verbal Contract for without it no gentleman's
library will be complete.
Karl P. Warden*
Associate Professor of Low, University of Denver College of Low.
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trends in tort law; supplemented by a pamphlet on the structure
and functioning of the human body.
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4. Principles of Business Law. By Essel R. Dillavou, Charles G.
Howard, Paul C. Roberts, William J. Robert. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. 1131 pages, $11.65. A text-casebook
dealing with several fields of law and their relationships to the
economic, social and political conditions of big business; supplemented by a glossary and some common forms used in business
law.
5.

Corporate Trust Administration. By Joseph C. Kennedy. New
York: New York University Press, 1961. 252 pages, $8.50. An
analysis of the typical indenture contract, problems under different sections of the indenture, problems created by a default
under an indenture, and suggestions as to how such problems
should be handled by the corporate trustee.
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OPINION NO. 21
OF THE ETHICS COMMITTEE OF THE COLORADO
BAR ASSOCIATION, ADOPTED AUGUST 11, 1961
AMENDED JULY 20, 1962
Comment:

Opinion No. 21 was first adopted August 11, 1961, and
appeared in the November-December, 1961 issue of
DICTA (Vol. XXXVIII, P. 369). The Committee subsequently clarified that Opinion, and it appears below
in its final form.
SYLLABUS

Persons associated in the same law firm may not ethically
charge separate fees as an estate fiduciary and attorney for their
respective services to the estate.
FACTS

A and B are members (or associates) of the same firm practicing law in Colorado. A client of the firm dies, leaving a will naming
A as executor, and A retains B as attorney for the estate. May they
ethically charge and receive both an executor's fee and an attorney's
fee in connection with the administration of this estate?
OPINION

In Doss v. Stevens (1899) 13 Colo. App. 535, 59 Pac. 67, our
court held that an administrator who is an attorney cannot be allowed compensation for his professional services to an estate as an
attorney. The rule of law has never been altered. The court quoted
with approval an Illinois case (Willard v. Basset, 27 Ill. 37) stating
unequivocally:
"The authorities are uniform that this (dual compensation) should not be allowed, and every principle of sound
policy forbids it. ***To allow him to become his own client,
and charge for professional services for his own case, although in a representative or trust capacity, would be holding out inducements for professional men to seek such representative places to increase the professional business,
which would lead to most pernicious results. This is forbidden by cvery sound principle of professional morality,
as well as by the policy of the law."
In Opinions 49 and 72 the American Bar Association Committee
has held:
"The relations of partners in a law firm are such that
neither the firm nor any member or associate thereof may
accept any professional employment which any member of
the firm cannot properly accept."
Lawyer A cannot be his own client in the sense that he both
takes a fiduciary fee and pays himself another fee for legal services
rendered to himself. That which is thus improper for Lawyer A
alone is likewise improper for Lawyer B under the instant facts,
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namely, any arrangement by which Lawyer A both takes a fiduciary fee and claims an allowance from the estate for another fee
for Lawyer B for legal services rendered to him. Either alternative
is, in our opinion, an improper pyramiding of fees.
This opinion neither sanctions nor condemns as a matter of
professional ethics the apparently widespread practice by which
Lawyer A waives any fiduciary fee for himself and (with court
approval) either claims an attorney fee for himself for handling
the estate affairs, both administrative and legal, or seeks only an
allowance for Lawyer B for legal services to the fiduciary. The
Committee refrains from passing upon any problems posed by a
direction in a Will whereby a testator authorizes his executor, an
attorney, to be allowed not only his fee as executor, but also a further fee as attorney for the executor if he acts as his own lawyer
(see, for example, In Re Thompson's Estate, 50 Cal. 2d 613, 328 P.2d
1, 65 A.L.R.2d 805).

OPINION NO. 23
OF THE ETHICS COMMITTEE OF THE COLORADO
BAR ASSOCIATION ADOPTED JULY 20, 1962
SYLLABUS

It is unethical for an attorney to represent the guardian of a
minor when the attorney is selected or employed by the insurance
company with whom a damage settlement for injuries sustained by
the minor has been negotiated.
FACTS

In a recent case an insurance company negotiated a settlement
with the natural guardian of a minor who had been injured by an
act of an insured person of the insurance company. The insurance
company, with the consent of the guardian, selected or employed
an attorney to represent the guardian in commencing the guardianship proceedings and obtaining court approval of the settlement
agreement. The attorney disclosed to the court his relationship to
the insurance company. The court denied the right of the attorney
to appear on behalf of the guardian.
OPINION

On the factual situation presented, it is the opinion of the
Committee that the actions of the attorney violated Canons 6 and 35
of the Canons of Ethics.
Canon 6 prohibits an attorney from representing conflicting
interests. It is patently apparent that the attorney was attempting
to represent incompatible interests. He could not conceivably be
considered as appearing before the court even as an impartial person advocating the fairness of the settlement agreement, when he
was initially selected or employed by the insurance company to
represent the guardian. The attorney represents only the lay agency
which intervened in violation of Canon 35 between himself and the
alleged client.
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A proviso to Canon 6 permits an attorney to represent conflicting interests if the express consent of all concerned is given
after a full disclosure of the facts. This proviso cannot be construed
as having universal application. It cannot be employed to permit
an attorney to represent both the plaintiff and the defendant in an
adversary proceeding, nor can it be employed to permit an attorney
to represent a fiduciary when the consent of the fiduciary to the
conflicting interest of the attorney would constitute a breach of the
fiduciary's duty.
The propriety of the court's action in guarding the -interests
of the minor under similar facts is fully established in Seaton v.
Tohill, 11 Colo. App. 211, 53 Pac. 170.
It should not be concluded from this opinion, however, that
it would be improper for the insurance company to agree to reimburse the guardian for legal fees incurred by the guardian in connection with the proceeding, when the selection and employment
of the attorney is entirely within the discretion of the guardian.

OPINION NO. 24
OF THE ETHICS COMMITTEE OF THE COLORADO
BAR ASSOCIATION ADOPTED JULY 20, 1962
SYLLABUS

It is not unethical for a firm of attorneys to have its offices
in the business premises of a financial institution which is a client
of the firm even though one of the attorneys may hold an executive
position in the institution. However, in such a situation, the firm
of attorneys will have to use great care to be certain that the close
connection with the financial institution is not in any way used,
directly or indirectly, for the purpose of soliciting professional
employment for the law firm.
FACTS

A firm of attorneys has its offices in the business premises
of a financial institution. One or more of the members of the firm
hold important executive positions in the institution. The firm is
the legal representative of the institution. A portion of the firm's
business consists of examining real estate titles for the institution,
preparing instruments of conveyance and security, and closing
loans.
Is such an arrangement proper under the Canons of Ethics?
OPINION

Canon 27 of the Canons of Professional Ethics prohibits the
solicitation by a lawyer of professional employment. The ABA Committee on Professional Ethics has, in several opinions, warned
against the indirect solicitation of business through a relationship
which an attorney may have with a lay agency. (See ABA Committee on Professional Ethics Opinions Nos. 31, 35, 57 and 225.) The
following admonition of the ABA Committee in its Opinion No. 57,
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quoted in Opinion No. 7 of this Committee, is directed to this problem and is worthy of being quoted again:
"It is not necessarily improper for an attorney to engage in a business; but impropriety arises when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner
as to be inconsistent with the lawyer's duties as a member
of the Bar. Such an inconsistency arises when the business
is one that will readily lend itself as a means for procuring
professional employment for him, is such that it can be
used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on his behalf, or is
of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded
as the practice of law. To avoid such inconsistencies it is
always desirable and .usually necessary that the lawyer
keep any business in which he is engaged entirely separate
and apart from his practice of the law and he must, in any
event, conduct it with due observance of the standards of
conduct required of him as Ia lawyer."
The facts indicate that the law firm has a very close connection
with the financial institution in whose offices it conducts its practice. The close physical arrangement may, of itself, cause the lay
agencies to serve as "feeders" of professional employment to the
firm, in violation of Canon 27. A heavy duty rests upon all members
of the law firm, and particularly upon the lawyer who holds an
executive position with or controls the lending institution, to see
that no such violation is allowed to occur. All persons connected
with the lay agency must be made to clearly understand that the
law firm is not associated with the lending institution and that it
would be unethical for the members of the law firm to take advantage of the close relationship for the purpose of providing the
law firm with additional professional employment.
The question is whether in fact indirect solicitation would be
probable. If, for example, the financial institution is a bank, industrial bank, or savings and loan association, having a ground floor
office which is visited by large numbers of the public, and if it
contains signs identifying the firm, or identifying individuals as
lawyers, there would surely be a dangerous posibility of solicitation,
and perhaps advertising. Borrowers might infer that employment of
the firm was necessary or at least highly desirable, in order to obtain
loans. The firm should move its offices to another part of the building.
If, on the other hand, the financial institution is a life
insurance
company, or some other entity having an upstairs office which is
not visited by large numbers of the public, the possibility of indirect
solicitation is probably remote. There may be difficult borderline
cases between these two extremes.
On carefully reviewing the situation, the members of the law
firm may determine that it is impossible to effectively avoid violations of Canon 27 while the firm is practicing in the same premises
as the lending institution with which one of its members is so
closely associated. While this Committee believes that the relationship, of itself, does not automatically result in unethical conduct, it
calls attention to the duty of the lawyers to carefully conduct their
practice in such a manner that any such violations will be avoided.

